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CAUSBY, JAMES FRANK, Ed.D. The Use of Court-Ordered Busing to 
Desegregate the Public Schools: Legal Aspects of Actions by the 
United States Supreme Court. (1988) 
Directed by Dr. Joseph Bryson. 178 pp. 
The purpose of this study was to present a historical per­
spective and legal basis for court-ordered busing to desegregate the 
public schools. The study examined pertinent Supreme Court decisions 
which dealt with de jure and de facto segregated school systems as 
well as the possibility of a limited return to neighborhood schools. 
Emphasis was placed on the evolution of decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court as those decisions mirrored attitudinal and 
societal changes in America. 
The findings of this study were: (1) the United States 
Supreme Court has consistently ruled against any school system in 
which de jure segregation has been found to exist, (2) in de facto 
segregation cases the Supreme Court required some busing as a punitive 
remedy, (3) if the Court found that an "intent" to segregate was 
present in a school system the "extent" of the remedy imposed by the 
Court often included extensive busing, (4) if a school system has 
been declared unitary its only responsibility is then to avoid 
illegal segregation, and (5) there is a trend for the Supreme Court 
to allow a return to neighborhood schools under proper circumstances. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0. Overview. 
1.1. Significance of Study. 
1.2. Purpose of Study. 
1.3. Methodology. 
1.4. Delimitations. 
1.5. Coverage and Organization of Issues Involved. 
1.6. Definition of Terms. 
1.0. Overview 
A review of court cases decided by the United States Supreme 
Court since 1954 establishes the fact that the use of court-ordered 
busing to desegregate the public schools is a real and present dilemma 
for many school systems today. A new chapter—perhaps the last one— 
in the troubled history of court-ordered busing has begun. Contro­
versial and sometimes violent from the start, court-ordered busing was 
a pragmatic remedy for a shameful history of legally segregated public 
schools J Children have the right to attend a school system that is 
free from illegal segregation, but that fact does not mean that they 
^Aric Press and Ann McDaniel, "Busing: The Next Phase," 
Newsweek, November 17, 1986, p. 60. 
2 
2 have a right to attend racially balanced schools. The Supreme 
Court has stated that there is no substantive constitutional right to 
3 any particular degree of racial balance or mixing. Racial imbalance 
is unconstitutional only when and to the extent that it is caused by 
governmental actions taken for the purpose of separating students by 
4 race. There have been many cases in which school districts were 
guilty of illegal separation of students by race. 3ut at what point 
may a district stop trying to erase the sins of its forebears? The 
Supreme Court has never specified how or when integration plans may 
end. ̂  
A review of judicial decisions, especially decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, can help school administrators and school 
board members understand the complexity of the busing issue and the 
school district's responsibility for dismantling a dual system. It 
is also important that school decision-makers understand that they may 
be required to adopt a busing program as one tool of desegregation. 
Even more difficult for school administrators and school board 
members to understand is the fact that while attempting to move to a 
unitary school system, it is very difficult to make every school in a 
2 Laurie Mesibov, "Busing in Unitary School Districts: A 
Board's Riqht to Modify the Plan," School Law Bulletin, Fall 1986, 
p. 22. 
3 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 
24 (1971). 
^Mesibov, "Busing," p. 22. 
^Press and McDaniel, "Next Phase," p. 60. 
3 
community reflect the racial composition of the school system as a 
whole. The difficulty in achieving a system-wide racial balance leads 
to schools that are all or predominantly one race and that will be 
closely scrutinized to determine whether assignments to those schools 
are part of state-enforced segregation. School officials must be 
prepared to show that actions increasing or continuing the effects of 
a dual system serve important and legitimate ends.6 
1.1. Significance of Study 
Resistance to desegregation as a link in the move toward 
integration did not commence in 1954 with the Brown I decision, but 
has been evident throughout American history. When the Supreme 
Court ruled that racial segregation of school children was unconsti­
tutional,^ the public schools did not change overnight. Generations 
of attitudes and opposition to desegregation could not be washed 
away "with all deliberate speed" as directed by the 1955 Brown II 
O 
decision. 
During the years following Brown II, the Supreme Court 
refrained from active involvement in the desegregation process. The 
Court relied on public school officials in the first instance and 
®Mesibov, "Busing," p. 22. 
''Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
®Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
4 
then, if necessary, on lower courts to bring about school desegrega­
tion.^ Concerned with the slow progress being made, the Court, on 
May 27, 1968, rendered its Green v. County School Board^ decision, 
and a new era in school desegregation began. This ruling ended the 
"freedom of choice" options that so many school systems in the South-
had used to implement desegregation and revealed the impatience of 
the justices at the slow speed with which school systems were being 
integrated. 
The Court did not rule in Green that "freedom of choice" plans 
were unconstitutional; it stated, however, that "the burden on a 
school board is to come forward with a plan that promises realisti­
cally to work now."^ The Court said that if there were other 
reasonable ways to bring about school desegregation then freedom of 
choice was unacceptable. 
Methods of desegregation became an issue again in Swann v. 
12 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, which became known as the 
first busing case. Busing had been the mechanism for more equitable 
educational opportunity for millions of school children across the 
g 
Perry A. Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions 
Affecting Education (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 1978), 
p. 74. 
^°Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia, 
391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
11 Ibid. 
12 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 
(1971). 
5 
country. Furthermore, children had been bused long distances for 
decades to perpetuate segregation. But when transportation for 
13 
desegregation was decreed, busing suddenly became a national issue. 
While Swann can be viewed as being representative of de jure 
cases, the Supreme Court's involvement with a de facto segregated 
school system came about in 1973 in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 
Denver, Colorado.^ The Court declared that "where no statutory dual 
system ever existed, plaintiffs must prove that it was brought about 
15 
or maintained by intentional state action." The plaintiffs in this 
case had proven this, and the Court ordered that desegregation 
proceed. 
The Keyes decision meant that many northern and western school 
systems, guilty of such practices as altering school zones to maintain 
segregation, setting up segregative feeder systems, and assigning 
staff on a racially discriminatory basis, would have to correct these 
violations of constitutional rights. But evidence of such violations 
had to be presented on a case-by-case basis. 
Busing was the primary tool of the district courts in public 
school desegregation. As desegregation was achieved in the South, and 
13 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Fulfilling the Letter and 
Spirit of the Law: Desegregation of the Nation's Public Schools 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 5. 
^Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 
189 (1973). 
15Ibid,, p. 194. 
6 
as de facto segregation was slowly addressed in the North and West, 
the Court became somewhat more tolerant of an all-white or all-black 
school if the situation resulted from housing patterns that were not 
influenced by public officials. This movement was evidenced in the 
1 fi 
1974 Mi 11iken decision. Later, the Court ordered extensive busing 
only if it were proven that public authorities intended to promote 
4.- I7 segregation. 
The Supreme Court has declined to resolve a major split between 
two 1986 federal appeals courts over the constitutionality of school 
districts' plans to abandon court-ordered student busing and return to 
I O 
neighborhood schools. The Court refused to consider the appeals of 
19 
Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk, and Board of Education of 
20 
Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowel 1. In Riddick the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that black plaintiffs challenging 
a school board's decision to stop busing elementary students (in 
order to prevent "white flight") must prove that the school board 
acted with "intent" to reestablish racial segregation. The Court of 
^Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 
(1974). 
^Austin Independent School District v. United States, 429 U.S. 
991 (1976). 
18 Tom Mirga, "Justices Decline to Review Cases on Desegrega­
tion," Education Meek, November 12, 1986, p. 1. 
^Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk, 784 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
20 Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 
795 F. 2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1986). 
7 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Dowel1, however, disapproved a simi­
lar school board initiative and insisted the inquiry was not whether 
stopping busing would create racial imbalance in the school 
21 
district. Thus, the Supreme Court failed to reach a conclusion on 
one of the last major unsettled issues of school-desegreation law: 
Must formerly segregated districts continue to bus students indefi­
nitely, even though they have complied fully with court orders and are 
now considered "unitary?" 
This study is significant for school boards and school 
administrators in that it provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
legal aspects of busing for public school desegregation. It offers 
historical perspectives and legal guidelines in making decisions con­
cerning student assignment policies. The study provides direction to 
school districts now under court-ordered busing plans who may be con­
sidering a return to neighborhood schools. 
1.2. Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to present a historical perspec­
tive and legal basis for Supreme Court-ordered busing to desegregate 
the public schools. It will be necessary to examine pertinent court 
decisions which deal with both de jure and de facto segregated school 
21 "Conflicting Desegregation Rulings Upheld," Legal Notes for 
Education, December 1986, p. 8, 
8 
districts. The following questions are of primary concern as this 
study is conducted: 
1. How has the Supreme Court ruled on the legality of busing 
involving de jure segregated school systems from Brown 
(1954) to 1988? 
2. How has the Supreme Court ruled on the legality of busing 
involving de facto segregated school systems from Brown 
(1954) to 1988? 
3. How has the United States Supreme Court ruled in cases 
where the intent to segregate by school officials was 
proven? 
4. How has the Supreme Court ruled on the legality of busing 
in school systems that have achieved unitary status but 
have since undergone resegregation? 
5. Are there specific trends to be determined from analysis 
of court cases? 
1.3. Methodology 
The basic methodology for this historical research study 
reviewed and analyzed the available references concerning the legal 
aspects of busing for the purpose of desegregation of the public 
schools in the United States. 
In order to determine whether a need existed for such research, 
the investigator undertook a search of Dissertation Abstracts for 
related topics. This investigation indicated a vacuum in the research. 
This finding led the investigator to proceed with the study. A 
9 
computer search from the Educational Resource Information Center 
(ERIC) was also completed to determine related dissertation topics. 
Journal articles related to the topic were located through use of 
such sources as Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, Education 
Index, Index to Legal Periodicals, and the Legal Resource Index. 
General research summaries were found in the Encyclopedia of 
Educational Research, various books and guides to school law, and in 
a review of related literature obtained through a computer search from 
Educational Resource Information Center (ERIC). 
Federal court cases related to the topic were located through 
use of the Corpus Juris Secundum, American Jurisprudence, the 
National Reporter System, American Digest System, and Shephard's Cita­
tions. Recent court cases were found by examining case summaries con­
tained in issues of the NOLPE School Law Reporter. All of the cases 
were reviewed and placed in categories corresponding to issues noted 
from the review of literature. 
1.4. Delimitations 
This study was limited to questions regarding the legal aspects 
of busing for desegregation as viewed and decided by the United States 
Supreme Court. Because this study was factual in theme and legal in 
nature, the study did not address such areas as (1) society, 
(2) politics, (3) religion, and (4) economics. The study did not 
touch on these areas because of the nature of judicial investigation. 
Although the writer recognized the importance of these areas to a 
complete study of busing, such research was beyond the practical 
limitations of this one study. 
10 
Since the ultimate decisions concern ing the legality of 
busing for desegregation lay within the final power of the United 
States Supreme Court, the primary source for research was an analysis 
of United States Supreme Court cases. This study necessarily included 
all significant United States Supreme Court cases relating to inte­
gration as a prelude to busing. The study also included other 
actions of the United States Supreme Court, even though those actions 
may have not been official decisions of the Court. Litigation began 
with Plessy in 1896, proceeded through Brown in 1954, through the ; 
study of Dayton in 1977, and ended with the study of Riddick and 
Dowel 1 in 1986. This study was limited to the United States Supreme 
Court decisions and actions as of January 1, 1988. This review of 
such literature provided a setting in which to place present day 
questions concerning busing. 
An examination of such landmark cases as Green and Swann, for 
example, gave rise to the understanding of the Court's guidelines* on 
such landmark cases. The limitations of this study should produce a 
more meaningful document to school administrators and school board 
members. 
1.5. Coverage and Organization of Issues Involved 
This is a historical study limited to the questions which 
address the legal aspects of busing for desegregation of the public 
schools. This study made use of selected court cases having to do 
with integration, in general, and busing, in particular. Utilization 
was made of books, articles, digests of Supreme Court decisions, 
11 
previous dissertation studies, and reports of the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights in the effort to answer the questions in 
this study. 
Chapter II contains a review of literature related to the 
history of school desegregation. This review covers the period of 
time through the Brown decisions of 1954 and 1955. An in-depth 
study is made of segregation as it existed prior to the landmark 
Brown decisions. 
Chapter III contains information on the legal aspects of 
busing for school desegretation. It describes the transition of the 
Supreme Court's philosophy from the prohibition of a segregated school 
system as in Brown I, to the Court ordered busing in Swann of de jure 
systems, through Court efforts against de facto segregated systems in 
Keyes, through recent court decisions which allow for relief of 
mandatory busing where segregation has been achieved. 
Chapter IV will analyze significant court cases in order to 
provide understanding of the legal aspects of busing for desegrega­
tion. Facts of the cases, decisions of the courts, and discussion 
of the cases are presented for each category. 
The concluding Chapter V of the study contains a summary of 
the information obtained from review of the literature and from 
analysis of selected court cases. The questions asked in the intro­
ductory part of the study are reviewed and answered. The conclusions 
draw together the most important legal points of busing litigation. 
Recommendations will be given that will help school administrators 
12 
and school boards better understand the complexity of the busing 
issue and serve as a guide in any decision-making activity involving 
busing for desegregation purposes. 
1.6. Definition of Terms 
For the purpose of this study, the following selected terms 
are defined: 
Action. Court proceeding, a suit. 
Appellant. A court or agency that has review power. 
Concurring Opinion. The opinion of one of several judges 
which is in agreement with the majority yet for reasons other than 
those of the majority. 
Consitutional Rule. A law deriving from the constitution or 
authoritative document of a nation or body of people. 
Court. The term Court is capitalized when it refers to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
De Facto. Existin g in actual fact, regardless of legal 
establishment of recognition. 
Defendant. In a court action, one who defends the propriety 
of his acts and against whom relief is brought. 
De Jure. Within the law, according to legal establishment as 
distinguished from actual fact. 
Desegregate. To free of any law, provision, or practice 
requiring isolation of the members of a particular race in separate 
uni ts. 
13 
Dissenting Opinion. The differing opinion from the majority 
opinion of a judge sitting on a panel. 
En Banc. The federal judges of one circuit sitting as a 
complete panel or court. 
Enjoin. To order or prohibit action. 
Injunction. Judicial order that restrains a person or agency 
from a certain course of action. 
Integration. The incorporation as equals into society or an 
organization of individuals of different groups (as races). 
Litigation. The legal proceedings by which a lawsuit is 
settled. 
Plaintiff. One who files a lawsuit. 
Remand. The returning of a court case from a superior court 
to a lower court. 
Segregation. The separation or isolation of a race, class, or 
ethnic group by enforced or voluntary residence in a restricted area, 
by barriers to social intercourse, by separate educational facili­
ties, or by other discriminatory means. 
Vacate. To make void or to annul a lower court's decision 
by action of a superior court. 
Writ of Certiorari. A court order that a higher court issues 
to a lower court requesting that court records be sent to the higher 
count for review. 
14 
CHAPTER II 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE PRIOR TO BUSING 
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
2.0. Introduction. 
2.1. Legal Racial Discrimination. 
2.2. The University School Cases. 
2.3. The Brown Decision(s). 
2.4. Summary 
2.0. Introduction 
On July 10, 1776 the Declaration of Independence was published 
in the Pennsylvania Gazette. In that same issue an advertisement 
22 also appeared offering a black slave for sale. Thus America was 
born over 200 years ago with a serious flaw. The Constitution itself 
was evidence of this flaw as it, in the first article, apportioned 
representatives according to the free population and "three-fifths 
23 
of all other Persons." 
President Abraham Lincoln, on September 22, 1962 announced 
that on the first of the following January "all persons held as slaves 
within any state or designated part of a state . . . shall be then, 
^Pensylvania Gazette, No. 2481 , July 10, 1776, p. 4. 
23 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Fulfilling the Letter and 
Spirit of the Law: Desegregation of the Nation's Public Schools, 
p. 1. 
15 
thence forward and forever free," and that on that day he would, by 
proclamation "designate that the states and parts thereof" which 
continued to hold slaves would be in "rebellion aginst the United 
24 States." President Lincoln then issued the Emancipation Proclama-
25 
tion on January 1, 1863. 
The United States Supreme Court's Brown I decision in 1954 
changed the social fabric of America. Chief Justice Earl Warren of 
the United States Supreme Court stated: 
We conclude that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of "separate-but-equal" has no place. pg 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. 
At the time that Brown I was handed down seventeen states 
actually practiced segregation as was required by state constitu­
tional or statutory law. The states were Alabama, Arkansas, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The four additional 
states that permitted segregation were Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico, 
and Wyoming.^ 
The period of time between 1776, when the Declaration of 
Independence was published, and 1954, when the Brown I decision was 
^The Lincoln Library, 31st ed. (Buffalo, N.Y.: The Frontier 
Press Co., 1868), p. 400. 
^Enamcipation Proclamation, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863). 
^Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 495 (1954). 
27 "High Court Bans School Segregation; 9-to-0 Decision Grants 
Time to Comply," The New York Times, '"ay 18, 1954, p. 14. 
16 
handed down by the Supreme Court, was filled with opposition to 
desegregation. This was true of all aspects of daily life in the 
United States, including public schools. America simply could not 
quickly erase the deep imprint of almost a century of legal slavery 
and the racial prejudice that was a result of that legal system of 
slavery. 
A complete review of literature pertaining to desegregation is 
unnecessary and impractical for this study. However, an historical 
perspective is presented in this chapter to give the reader an over­
view and understanding of this important subject. This background 
will help to understand what our nation faced as the attempt was made 
to desegregate the public schools. 
2.1. Legal Racial Discrimination 
A resolution for a Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
was received by the United States House of Representatives in December 
1863. This amendment would prohibit slavery within the United States 
or any place subject to its jurisdiction. The Thirteenth Amendment 
was ratified in January 1865 and slavery was officially abolished in 
28 
the United States. 
In taking a historical view of segregation two early legisla­
tive documents are important. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, were concerned with the 
rights of every man and yet seemed to provide the opportunity for a 
28 U.S., Constitution, amend. XIII, sec. 1. 
17 
dual school system of education for blacks and whites throughout the 
South. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted to protect the newly 
freed blacks from the Black Codes and other repressive laws. The 
statute stated: 
There shall be no discrimination in the Civil Rights of 
Immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory 
of the United States on account of race, color, or 
previous conditions of slavery . . . .29 
In 1868 the Congress of the United States adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment which provided blacks with citizenship and 
30 guaranteed them equal protection of the laws. This equal protection 
of the laws also gave cause for intervention by the federal government 
where violations of individual constitutional rights were proven. 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was very precise in 
restriction of states enacting laws that limited the rights of 
citizens: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with­
out due process of law; nor deny any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.31 
^Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27. 
30 
U.S., Constitution, amend, XIV, sec. 1. 
18 
If the Fourteenth Amendment prevented states fron enacting 
legislation that abridged the rights of blacks, how then were states 
able to enact laws which clearly discriminated against blacks in 
almost every area of life, including separate schools? The answer to 
that question lies in the atmosphere of the time. 
While the Fourteenth Amendment was being debated in the United 
States House of Representatives, the Senate passed "an act donating 
certain lots in the city of Washington for schools for colored chil­
dren in the District of Columbia." The legislation also provided 
funds for equitable apportionment of school funds to schools for 
black children.3^ 
During debate in the United States Senate on the Fourteenth 
Amendment concern was expressed that the amendment would end segrega­
tion in the schools. The bill's patron, Senator Lyman Trumball of 
Illinois, assured the Senate that the act affected only civil rights. 
The chairman of the Judiciary Committee stated, in opening debate, 
". . . nor do they mean that their children shall attend the same 
schools."3"^ 
Southern states wasted little time in moving to enact legisla­
tion that established separate schools for blacks and whites. 
Alabama's law illustrates the action taken by the states in the 
32 U.S. Congress, Senate, A Question of Intent, David J. Moys, 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, May 14, 1959, p. 2. 
33Ibid., p. 2, Note 5. 
19 
South. It stated: 
The General Assembly shall establish, organize, and 
maintain a system of public schools in the state, for 
the equal benefit of the children, thereof, between 
the ages of seven and twenty-one; but separate schools-. 
shall be provided for the children of African descent. 
The social attitude of the people of the United States was 
reflected in the legislation that was enacted. John Dollard stated 
that "caste replaced slavery as a means of maintaining the essence of 
35 the old status order in the South." The laws, during this time 
period, were not without challenge. From 1865 to 1935 the school 
segregation laws were challenged thirty-seven times. In each case, 
however, the courts upheld the separate schools. Only nine of these 
cases proved partially successful. The courts most often found that 
36 inequality had not been proven. Only two cases were heard by the 
37 Supreme Court during some fifty years of de jure segregation. 
Why were the laws not successfully challenged in the courts? 
Again, the atmosphere of the time must be considered. Gunner Myrdal 
34 
John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), p. 61. 
35 
Ibid., p. 62. 
36 
Richard Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), p. 216. 
37 
H.C. Hudgins, Jr., The Warren Court and Its Public Schools 
(Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 
1970), p. 76. 
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in An American Dilemma states the reasoning as: 
It is generally held that the Supreme Court acted in 
agreement with, and actually expressed what was then 
the general sentiment even in the North. The North 
had gotten tired of the Negro problem and, anyhow, saw 
no immediate alternative other than to let the white 
Southerners have their own way with the Negroes. But 
it must not be forgotten that the decisions of the 
Court had themselves a substantial share in the responsi­
bility for the solidification of Northern apathy.38 
Congress addressed the disintegrating rights of the black man 
in the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871, the latter known as the 
Ku Klux Klan Act. Both statutes sought to protect the black man's 
39 vote and his person from private as well as public intimidation. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 specifically provided heavy penalties for 
any person who "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, custom, or 
usage of any State," deprived any person of rights secured by the 
Constitution.^ The Civil Rights Act of 1875 sought to protect the 
black man against assaults on his dignity as well as his person. It 
was a law ahead of its time, a forerunner in concept to the public 
accommodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Section 1 of 
the 1875 Act provided simply that blacks should have access with 
41 whites to inns, theaters, and public transportation. The act was 
^Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and 
Row Publisher, 1962), p. 516. 
OQ 
J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, From Brown to Bakke (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 15. 
^Third Enforcement Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (also 
known as Civil Rights Act of 1871). 
^Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke, p. 16. 
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designed to protect the civil and legal rights of blacks in that it 
sought social, as well as political, equality for Southern blacks. 
In part, the act stated: 
Be it enacted, that all persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States shall be entitled to the full and 
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances 
on land or water, theaters and other places of public 
amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitat-
tions established by law, and applicable alike to 
citizens of every race and color regardless of any 
previous conditions of servitude. 
But the Supreme Court found this law unconstitutional in the 
43 
Civil Rights Cases of 1883. Discrimination by owners of theaters, 
hotels, and the like was a private matter, held the Court, and not at 
all the business of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 
This ruling by the Supreme Court, in effect, said that the 
black man was no longer to be protected and looked after. It was 
high time, the Court now announced, for the black man to make his 
own way. In the decision, the Court stated: 
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of 
beneficient legislation has shaken off the inseperable 
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in 
the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of 
a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite 
of the laws . . . ."45 
42 / Harry A. Ploski and Ernest Kaiser, The Negro Almanac (New 
York: Bellwether Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), p. 132. 
43Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
44Ibid. 
45Ibid. 
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In spite of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, the period of 1880 through the early 1900s saw the enactment of 
many state laws directed toward segregation of the black race. 
These laws were referred to as "Jim Crow" laws.^ According to 
C. Vann Woodward, the term "Jim Crow" came into use in the late 1800s 
and possibly referred to a song and dance called "Jim Crow" which was 
written by Thomas C. Rice. Although the origin of the term "Jim Crow" 
47 is uncertain, the meaning of the term was quite clear. In reference 
to "Jim Crow" practices Woodward stated: 
That code lent the sanction of law to a racial ostracism 
that extended to churches and schools, to housing and 
jobs, to eating and drinking. Whether by law or by 
custom, that ostracism eventually extended to virtually 
all forms of public transportation, to sports and 
recreation, to hospitals, orphanages, prisons and 
asylums, and ultimately to funeral homes, morgues, and 
cemeteries. 
The states of Virginia and North Carolina enacted legislation 
that forbade all fraternal organizations that permitted members of 
different races to address each other as "brother." Alabama adopted 
a law prohibiting white female nurses from attending black male 
patients. A New Orleans ordinance segregated white and black 
prostitutes in separate districts. A Birmingham ordinance made it 
unlawful for a black person and a white person to play together at 
46 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 7. 
47 Alan Barth, Prophets With Honor, First Vintage Books Edition 
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1974), p. 2i6. 
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, p. 7. 
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games of dominoes or checkers, or even to be in each other's company. 
Oklahoma banned any companionship between the races while boating or 
fishing.^9 
As early as 1849 there existed in the North an attitude of 
separate schools for black children. Such laws in some Northern and 
50 Western states were changed after the 1860s. The issue of segre­
gated schools in the North arose in an early case that questioned 
whether a general school committee could exclude a black child from 
attending a school nearest the child's home when a special school 
was available for black children. 
Sarah C. Roberts v. The City of Boston was concerned with a 
five-year-old black child in Boston who applied for a change to a 
school near her home. Admission was denied because the girl was 
balck and because of a special provision set up for certain schools 
51 for black students. 
The plaintiff had applied for admission to the primary school 
nearest her home, but the application had been rejected. Earlier 
the girl had petitioned the general primary school which referred the 
case to the district committee. The district committee denied per­
mission to attend the school. The plaintiff, Sarah Roberts, then 
49 
Barth, Prophets With Honor, p. 26. 
50 Robert M. Stockard, The United States Supreme Court and the 
Legal Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation (EdTDl 
Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1978), 
p. 15. 
51 Sarah C. Roberts v. The City of Boston, 59 Massachusetts (5 
Cushing) 198 (1849). 
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52 went directly to the school where she was rejected by the teacher. 
The plaintiff sought a court order that would compel the defendant 
school board to pay damages under a statute that stated a qualified 
53 child could not lawfully be excluded from public school instruction. 
Both the trial court and the appellate court held in favor of 
the defendant school board. The ruling held that the child was not 
excluded from school, and instruction was not denied to the student. 
In fact, it was held that her father had denied Sarah Roberts' admis-
54 sion by not applying at the school provided. 
From the time of the Roberts case to the Brown I decision, the 
doctrine of separate facilities was considered common law. School 
boards had a constitutional right to provide separate schools for the 
instruction of black children and to prevent attendance in any other 
public school in the same school district. The 1954 Brown I decision 
overturned this concept when the Supreme Court held that "separate but 
equal" facilities were unequal as well as unconstitutional. 
During the period following the Civil War, known as the period 
of Reconstruction, Southern states were permitted to maintain 
separate schools for the races. The challenge to separateness came 
52 Chester M. Nolte, School Law in Action, 101 Key Decisions 
With Guidelines for School Administrators (West Nyack, N.Y.: Parker 
Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), p. 30. 
53Ibid., p. 31. 
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from states other than those in the South. These cases brought 
approval of the segregated school, and no case was found otherwise in 
55 the United States Supreme Court. 
The South suddenly found itself left to pursue its own way 
with blacks. Taking advantage of this situation, Southern states 
began in 1887 to enact rigid laws which established racial separation. 
One such early law, a Louisiana statute of 1890 requiring "equal but 
separate accommodations for black and white railway passengers," was 
56 at issue in Plessy v. Ferguson. 
The New Orleans black aristocracy was mindful and resentful of 
the natural anti-black feeling of the 1880s. The Louisiana statute 
concerning separation of the races on railroads was particularly dis­
tasteful to blacks. The black leaders of New Orleans determined to 
test the constitutionality of the law. Homer Plessy was sent to buy 
a first-class ticket on the East Louisiana Railway. The ticket placed 
the passenger in a first-class coach from New Orleans to Covington, 
, • • 57 Louisiana. 
Homer Plessy, the man who would be removed from the railroad 
car, appeared to be white. He was an octoroon, the offspring of a 
white and a quadroon. Plessy was only one-eighth black; only one of 
his great-grandparents had been black. For some, however, that was 
one great-grandparent too many. "One drop of Negro blood makes a 
55 
Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record, p. 90. 
56Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
57Ibid., p. 541. 
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Negro," a character in a best-selling novel of the day exclaimed. 
"It kinks the hair, flattens the nose, thickens the lips, puts out the 
58 light of intellect and lights the fires of brutal passion . . . 
On June 7, 1892, Homer Plessy presented a first-class ticket 
and boarded the train. He was seated in an orderly fashion in the 
first-class car reserved for white passengers. The conductor asked 
Plessy to move to the car entitled "colored." Plessy refused and was 
arrested by Detective Christopher C. Cain. Plessy was charged with a 
violation of Louisiana statute. Plessy's friends formed a group 
called the Citizens Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the 
59 Separate Car Law and provided him with legal representation. 
A plea for Plessy was entered in the Criminal District Court 
for the Parish of New Orleans. Argument stated that the law Plessy 
was charged under was "null and void" and conflicted with the Consti­
tution of the United States. The court ruled against Plessy, but a 
hearing was held on a writ of prohibition and certiorari in 
November, 1392 in the State Supreme Court. At a later hearing, Plessy 
was granted a writ of error that allowed him to seek redress before 
the Supreme Court of the United States.5^ 
CO 
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On May 18, 1896 Associate Justice Henry Brown delivered the 
opinion of the Court: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's 
argument (that separate but equal facilities for black 
and white passengers was psychologically damaging to Negroes) 
to consist in the assumption that enforced separation of 
the two races stamp the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything 
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chose 
to put that construction upon it.6^ 
So the doctrine of "separate but equal" was upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court. During the next fifty-eight years this 
doctrine was cited in most civil rights cases. The Plessy doctrine 
applied to almost every phase of life, including education, even 
62 
though Plessy was concerned with transportation. 
Three years after the Plessy decision, in 1899, a United States 
Supreme Court decision was handed down in the case of Cumming v. 
CO 
Board of Education. This case specifically involved public schools. 
The issue in Cumming was to decide whether the only black high school 
in the school system, which enrolled sixty students, could be consti­
tutionally closed in order to convert to a three-hundred student 
elementary school, while at the same time continuing to maintain the 
white high school. The black high school was not to be opened at that 
time due to a lack of school funding. The injunction filed by the 
61Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 558 (1896). 
62 Stockard, The United States Supreme Court and the Legal 
Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation, p. 23. 
63 
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blacks stated that an inequality existed because of the county's 
failure to provide a high school for blacks while white students were 
furnished with a high school. In argument, the attorneys for the 
64 blacks debated that separate schools were unconstitutional. 
The Court was unanimous in refusing relief and found no evi­
dence of racial discrimination. The Justices also held that the 
relief requested was improper in that closing the white high school 
would not remedy the wrong suffered by the blacks. The Court held 
that because it would be "only tyranny" and because of economic condi­
tions, black students were not deprived of their constitutional 
65 rights. The "separate but equal" doctrine had been upheld and 
fully applied to the nation's schools. 
. In time the word equal became forgotten. Signs of inequality 
sprouted everywhere, A water fountain located in a park happened 
not to work; at the back of the restaurant was the black carry-out 
line; in the theater was the Jim Crow balcony. 
In schools, especially, inequalities were evident.^ In the 
early 1930s in Randolph County, Georgia, $36.66 was expended 
annually for the education of each white child, while only 43 cents 
67 
was spent on each black child. Russell County, Alabama, spent 
64Ibid., p. 531. 
65Ibid., p. 531. 
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$45.74 per white child each year and only $2.55 per black child.68 In 
Upson County, Georgia, for every $1.00 of declared value of black 
69 
schools, white schools were valued at $2,055. In 1944 the South as 
a whole spent almost three times as much per white pupil as per black 
pupil; Georgia and Mississippi spent five times as much.^ 
It was in 1938 that the nation began the long road to equality 
of educational opportunity. In that year, the Supreme Court embarked 
on a series of decisions attempting to enforce the "separate but 
equal" doctrine. These decisions, known as the university school 
cases, ultimately led to the rejection of that doctrine. 
2.2 The University School Cases 
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
began in the mid 1930s a legal assault on racial discrimination in the 
schools. Their plan was to attack the reluctance of Southern states to 
admit blacks to graduate professional schools such as state university 
law schools. The NAACP based its strategy on the premise that the 
Southern states had made no attempt to maintain equality in the pro­
fessional schools. Thus "separate but equal" did not exist. Even if 
Southern states had tried to provide equal facilities for the graduate 
level education of blacks, the expense would have been prohibitive.7^ 
6SIbid., p. 52. 
69Ibid., p. 111. 
^Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke, p. 19 
^Stockard, The United States Supreme Court and the Legal 
Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation, p. 29. 
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The plan to attack segregation in Southern universities began 
slowly but.later paid outstanding dividends. In the mid 1930s all 
Southern states and nearly half the United States still either 
72 
required or permitted segregation in schools. Few people doubted 
that black children were denied educational opportunities equal to 
73 that of white children. Yet, the record of federal cases showed no 
serious breach in the color line as far as federal court decisions 
74 were concerned, until the Gaines case of 1938. 
75 In Gaines v. Canada, Registrar of the University of Missouri, 
a black student sought entry to law school within his home state. He 
was denied admittance to the all-white University of Missouri Law 
School. The state in turn offered to pay his tuition at an out-of-
state institution since Missouri provided no law school for blacks. 
The Court held this offer to be 
a denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment 
of the privilege which the state has set up . . . the 
provision for the payment of tuition fees in another 
state does not remove the discrimination.'6 
72 
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The Court's decision actually, in effect, affirmed the 
"separate but equal" doctrine, even for law schools. The only obli­
gation the state had was to furnish facilities within its borders for 
"legal education substantially equal to those which the State 
77 afforded for persons of the white race." 
The state of Missouri did erect a separate law school for black 
students; thus the principle of "separate but equal" was left unim-
78 paired. However, Gaines was a case wherein the Court considered 
the "equal" part of the separation principle. The Justices recognized 
the advantages of studying law in the state where people lived and 
expected to practice. The Court's decision was that a state was 
required to allow blacks to be admitted at the state university if 
equal educational facilities were not available. In Missouri this 
decision had the effect of establishing a separate graduate school 
for blacks. 
In 1948 another black applicant asserted that she was entitled 
to a legal education at the University of Oklahoma Law School. The 
state contended that local law allowed for the provision of a 
separate law school for blacks upon demand or notice and that the 
applicant had not sought such relief. In Sipuel v. University of 
79 Oklahoma the Supreme Court recognized that the plaintiff could not 
77Ibid., p. 351. 
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be expected to wait for construction of a law school before completing 
her education. The Court stated: 
The petitioner is entitled to secure legal education 
afforded by a State institution. To this time, it has 
been denied her although during the same period many 
white applicants have been afforded legal education by 
the State. The State must provide it for her in con- ! 
formity with the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and provide itnas soon as it does 
for applicants of any other group.80 
Oklahoma tried another tactic with a black student admitted to 
a state university graduate school. Under a new state law, the stu­
dent was provided an education on a segregated basis. He sat in a 
section of the classroom surrounded by a rail with a sign reading 
"Reserved for Colored." He was assigned one desk in the library and 
prohibited from using any other. He was required to eat in the 
cafeteria at a different time from all other students. 
This arrangement did not satisfy the Court. It ruled in 
0 1  
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents that: 
apart from the other students. The result is that the 
appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective 
graduate instruction. There is a vast difference - a 
Constitutional difference - between restrictions imposed o •• 
by the State which prohibit the commingling of students, 
and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the 
State presents no such bar.82 
80Ibid., pp. 632-33. 
^McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
82Ibid., p. 641. 
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The Court ruled that "state imposed restrictions which produce 
OO 
such inequalities cannot be sustained."0 The Court concluded that 
conditions under which this appellant was required to receive his 
education deprived the man of "personal and present right to equal 
protection of the laws."84 Thus the Supreme Court refused to uphold 
laws that separated the races for educational purposes. 
In 1950, on the same day the McLaurin decision was handed down, 
the Court decided in Sweatt v. Painter85 that a new separate law 
school for blacks operated by the state of Texas could not provide 
equal protection of the laws. The state of Texas had tried to 
circumvent the equal protection questions by hastily setting up a 
separate law school for blacks in the basement of a building located 
in Austin near the capitol. Meantime, Herman Sweatt was denied 
admission to the University of Texas on the grounds that "separate 
but equal" was indeed the law of Texas. The University was restricted 
to admit white students in accordance with Texas state law.8® 
The United States Supreme Court, in a decision written by 
Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson, ordered Sweatt's admission to the 
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
631. 
84Ibid. 
85Sweatt v. 
8®Ibid., p. 
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University's all-white law school as the Court recognized the inequal­
ity between the hastily erected law school at Austin and the Univer­
sity of Texas Law School. In this case, as well as in McLaurin, the 
Court emphasized the "intangibles" that make an educational institu­
tion equal: 
Such qualities . . . include the reputation of the 
faculty, experience of the administration, position and 
influence of the alumni, standing in the community, 
traditions and prestige.87 
The Court added that the new black law school excluded 85 percent of 
the population from which were drawn most of the lawyers, witnesses, 
jurors, judges, and other officials in the state that a black lawyer 
would eventually encounter. For this reason, the Court said, "We 
cannot conclude that the education offered the petitioner is sub­
stantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the 
University of Texas Law School."8® 
It was obvious that Sweatt and McLaurin were milestones in the 
fight for rights for blacks. There had been much progress in winning 
admission for some black graduate students to white schools. However, 
it looked as if there would be a long struggle before the black public 
school students would be allowed to attend school with white chil­
dren. 89 The Court had actually done little to break down the 
87Ibid., p. 634. 
88Ibid. 
89 Robert A. Liston, Tides of Justice (New York: Delacorte 
Press, 1966), p. 34. 
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"separate but equal" rule. The Court's findings seemed to strengthen 
the "separate but equal" rule since, in both cases, facilities were 
found not to be adequate because standards concerning the required 
"separate but equal" rule were not met. 
While states were not able to achieve equality at the graduate 
school level, they could achieve equality in the black public schools 
if enough resources and time were available. All over the South 
white school boards began programs to improve black public schools. 
Governor James Byrnes confessed that improvements had to be made to 
"remedy a hundred years of neglect" of the education for black children 
90 lest the Supreme Court "take matters out of the states' hands." 
While these university school cases did not break down the 
"separate but equal" rule, they were the beginning blow that led to 
its demise. Dr. H.C. Hudgins, Jr. gave a clear view of the effect of 
the university school cases on the "separate but equal" principle. 
Hudgins stated: 
The significance of the four university cases is manifest 
as one sees a gradual erosion of the separation doctrine. 
Both Gaines and Sipuel opened the way for Negroes to attend 
white institutions. McLaurin held that, once a school has 
been desegregated its facilities must be made available 
to all alike, its students must be accorded similar treat­
ment. Sweatt expanded the holding in showing a segregated 
school to be unequal and in pointing out intangible factors 
as measurements of potential success. It was these cases 
which actually provided the springboard for an attach on 
segregation in the public elementary and secondary schools 
in a case to be heard by the Warren Court. 1 
90 Garraty, Quarrels That_Have Shaped the Constitution, p. 256. 
91 Hudgins, The Warren Court, p. 19. 
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2.3 The Brown Decision(s) 
Follwoing the university cases, the NAACP found it necessary 
to alter its strategy. While it had been successful in attaching the 
"equal" part of the "separate but equal" laws, it had achieved no 
success in attacking the "separate" issue. The many states that had 
enacted segregation laws were apparently in compliance with the doc­
trine of "separate but equal." They were, in fact, quickly bringing 
about a more equal education for black students by improving school 
facilities for blacks, purchasing new equipment for black schools, and 
upgrading the staff of black schools. 
The Southern states appeared determined to continue the segre­
gation of black and white students at all levels of education, even if 
that course of action caused them to have to greatly increase their 
spending for black schools. School boards in South Carolina and in 
Virginia's Prince Edward County openly rejected any program that 
would provide more adequate schools while allowing some primary and 
92 secondary school desegregation. The NAACP had indicated its will­
ingness to accept some form of gradualist program. When any such pro­
gram was rejected by the segregated states, the NAACP found it neces-
93 sary to alter its strategy. 
In 1950 the NAACP held a National Strategy Conference in New 
York. Thurgood Marshal, Chief Legal Counsel for the group and later 
92 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, p. 257. 
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a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and his legal staff 
selected five segregation suits from around the nation. These five 
suits were to be the focal point of an effort to seek admission for 
black school children to all-white schools. Four of the suits were 
from the states of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Deleware. 
The fifth case was from the District of Columbia. That case was to be 
heard separately by the United States Supreme Court because the 
District of Columbia was governed by the United States Congress. 
Four suits were filed in federal district courts seeking 
admission of black school children to all-white schools. These suits 
were based on the belief that the black schools were inferior to 
white schools. The NAACP charged that the "separate but equal" 
doctrine was a violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The fifth suit, Boiling v. Sharpe, was filed in the District of 
Columbia and charged violation of due process of the Fifth Amendment. 
Since the Fourteenth Amendment restricted states, and the District of 
Columbia was not governed by a state legislature but rather by 
94 Congress, a different procedure was used in this case. 
95 The four cases were Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
from Kansas, Briggs v. Elliott^ from South Carolina, Davis v. 
^Brown v. Board of Education of Topeks, 345 U.S. 973 (1953). 
96Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F Supp. 920 (1952). 
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97 County School Board of Prince Edward County from Virginia, and 
go 
Gebhart v. Belton from Deleware. In each of the four cases, black 
students sought admission to the public schools of their community on 
a nonsegregated basis. State residents and taxpayers who were 
challenging these laws had been denied reflief, except for partial 
relief in the Delaware case. The federal district courts denying 
relief relied on the "separate but equal" doctrine announced by the 
99 Court in Plessy. 
South Carolina's state constitution and statutes required 
segregation of blacks. In Briggs v. Elliott^00 action was brought in 
the United States District Court to prevent the enforcement of these 
statutes in Clarendon County. The District Court determined that the 
black schools were inferior to the white schools in Clarendon County 
and ordered the state to equalize the schools. However, the court 
upheld the state constitution as valid if the facilities for black 
students were equal to facilities for the white students. During the 
period of equalization, the black children were denied the right to 
attend the white school. The equalization process was to be reported 
back to the court within six months. This decision was immediately 
appealed to the United Supreme Court but was returned to the lower 
97 
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court to assess the progress toward equalization. The lower court 
found that there was substantial equality between the white and black 
schools except for buildings. The case was then returned to the 
Supreme Court J 
102 
In Davis v. County School Board the concerns of black 
parents were that even though blacks made up forty-six percent of the 
total county population every black school in the county was 
103 inferior. They were especially concerned about overcrowded and 
decrepit conditions of the black high school. A plea was made in 1950 
by the Parent Teachers Association to the county school board for a 
new high school. As was typical of the attitude of the South at that 
time, the black parents were told that there was no money for a new 
high school.^ 
Following the unsuccessful attempts by parents to improve the 
high school, black students then walked out of school and established 
picket lines. The black student leaders requested to meet with the 
superintendent of schools. The only way the superintendent would 
agree to meet with the students was if they returned to class. They 
^Stockard, The United States Supreme Court and the Legal 
Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation, p. 41. 
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refused to do this and instead appealed to the NAACP for assistance. 
The initial litigation attempted to abolish the segregated school 
system J05 
This Virginia suit, as well as the other four suits, involved 
introducing extensive testimony from experts in social science con­
cerning the effects of segregation on black children. One such expert 
was a leading black psychologist from New York University, Kenneth 
Clark.^ Professor Clark testified to the psychologically damaging 
effects of inferior black schools. He submitted a statement signed by 
thirty-two social scientists as expert witnesses who agreed with his 
position. Clark stated that based on his experiments the "fundamental 
effect of segregation is basic confusion in individuals and their con­
cept about themselves." In Clark's opinion, the black children in 
segregated schools had been "definitely harmed in the development of 
their personalities."^ 
The three-judge district court panel refused to grant relief to 
the plaintiff. The court conceded that the black school was 
"substantially inferior," but since the Prince Edward County Board of 
105 
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 103 F 
Supp. 337 (1952). 
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Kenneth B. Clark, "The Social Scientists, the Brown Decision 
and Contemporary Confusion," in Argument: The Complete Oral Argument 
Before the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka, 
1952-55, ed. Leon Friedman (New York: Chelsea House,11369), 
pp. xxxvi-xxxvii. 
^Lino A. Groglia, Disaster by Decree (Ithasa, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1976), pp. 27-28. 
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Education has agreed, in the meantime, to build a new black high 
108 school, "an injunction could accomplish nothing more." The 
plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court asking that the district 
court's decision be overruled and to require that the black students 
109 be admitted to the all-white high school. 
The case from New Castle County, Delaware, had achieved partial 
success. Suit was filed on behalf of elementary and high school black 
students to enjoin enforcement of segregation laws. An injunction was 
granted and it was ordered that black students were to be admitted to 
white schools on the grounds that the schools were "substantially 
unequal.This decision was appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court 
where the lower court's ruling was upheld. The court did not overturn 
Plessy, but implied that a school for blacks that was more equal than 
the present school might, in the future, make racial segregation law­
ful. This decision was very different from the Virginia and South 
Carolina decisions in that the ruling stated the "right of the 
plaintiff to equal facilities to be present and personal.It was 
held by the court that schools could be separate if they were 
currently equal. The decision was appealed by school authorities. 
108 Meier and Rudwick, The Making of Black America, Vol. II, 
p. 272. 
109Ibid. 
110Gebhart v. Belton, 91A 2d 137 (1952). 
^Hudgins, The Warren Court, p. 78. 
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They alleged that the state had not allowed a reasonable time for the 
112 equalization of facilities for blacks. 
The fourth case cited in Brown was from Kansas and become the 
command decision for all four cases to the United States Supreme 
Court. It arose from a complaint issued on behalf of a black child, 
eleven-year-old Linda Brown, and other black elementary school stu­
dents who had been denied admission to public schools for white 
children. At question was a Kansas statute that allowed cities in 
Kansas with a population of 15,000 or more to maintain segregated 
school facilities for students grades one through eight. The Topeka 
school board segregated elementary school students in grades one 
through six. 
Linda Brown was assigned to a school for black students. To 
reach this school it was necessary for her to travel over four times 
as far as would have been necessary if she had been permitted to 
attend an all-white school. The suit attempted to enjoin the enforce­
ment of the Kansas statute and to declare the law unconstitutional. 
The basis for this request was that segregation created inferiority 
113 and was, therefore, a denial of due process and equal protection. 
The Topeka school board argued that schools for blacks and 
whites had been equalized, or were being equalized, with respect to 
buildings, curriculum, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and 
n q 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 485 (1954). 
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other tangible factors.^ The district court agreed with the 
plaintiffs that segregation in the public school was psychologically 
detrimental to black children. But the court chose not to overturn 
Plessy. It found that the schools were substantially equal. The 
court felt that it was bound by previous decisions made by the United 
States Supreme Court. It ruled that absolute equality was impossi-
115 ble. The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court. In the meantime, however, the Topeka school board abolished 
1 1 fi elementary school segregation in 1953. 
The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the four cases 
on appeal in 1952. The Court joined the cases and referred to the 
suit as Brown. Arguments were heard by the Court in the December, 
1952 session. The NAACP argued that Plessy had been decided in 
117 error. United States Attorney General Edward McGranahan requested 
the Supreme Court to declare school segregation invalid under the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kenneth Clark, 
and some thirty other social scientists, attacked school segregation 
on the grounds that it did vast psychological damage to both black and 
114Ibid., p. 486 (Head Note 1). 
115 
Hudgins, The Warren Court, p. 77. 
116ibid. 
117 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, 
p. 265t 
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children. John W. Davis, a noted constitutional lawyer, presented a 
118 powerful argument for the defense. 
The Court appeared to be in sympathy with the cause of the 
NAACP and decided to reexamine the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It searched for some rational justification for setting 
aside the "separate but equal" doctrine resulting from the Plessy 
119 decision. 
In reargument, the Supreme Court gave the following directive: 
In their brief, and on oral argument, counsel are requested 
to discuss particularly the following questions in so far 
as they are relevant to the respective cases: 
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which sub­
mitted, and the State legislatures and conventions 
which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, contemplated 
or did not understand that it would abolish segregation 
in public schools? 
2. If neither the Congress, in submitting, nor the States, 
in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, understood that 
compliance with it would require the immediate aboli­
tion of segregation in public schools, was it neverthe­
less the understanding of the framers of the Amendment 
(a) that future Congress might, in the exercise of 
their power under Section 5 of the Amendment, 
abolish such segregation, or 
(b) that it would be within the judicial power in the 
light of future conditions, to construe the Amend­
ment as abolishing such segregation of its own force? 
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a) and 
(b) do not dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial 
power, in construing the Amendment, to abolish segrega­
tion in public schools? 
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, 
(a) would a decree necessarily follow that, within the 
limits set by normal geographic school districting, 
118Ibid., p. 259. 
119 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, 
p. 260. 
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Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools 
of their choice, or 
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, 
permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought 
about from existing segregated systems to a system 
not based on color distinctions? 
5. On the assumption, on which questions 4(a) and (b) are 
based, and assuming further that the Court will exercise 
its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b), 
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these 
cases; 
(b) is so, what specific issues should decrees reach; 
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear 
evidence with a view to recommending specific terms 
for such decrees; 
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first 
instance with directions to frame decrees in these 
cases; and, if so, what general directions should the 
courts of first instance follow in arriving at the 
specific terms of more detailed decrees?^™ 
The NAACP called a total of 130 social scientists to help 
answer these questions. Thurgood Marshall argued from the viewpoint 
of legal advocacy rather than history. In the final decision the 
Court did not attempt to resolve the historical problem. The decision 
121 was based on sociological grounds. 
The Eisenhower Administration argued that the authors of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not make their intent clear as to the 
abolishment of segregation. However, they argued, the broad purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to "secure for Negroes full anci com­
plete equality before the law, and to abolish all legal distinctions 
122 based upon race." The brief presented by Attorney General Herbert 
l?n 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 345 U.S. 972 (1953). 
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Browne!! suggested a one-year transition period in the South because 
123 of complicated racial and educational problems involved. 
The defense argued that the Reconstruction Congress had not 
intended for the Fourteenth Amendment to abolish segregation and had 
even voted funds for segregated schools in the District of 
124 Columbia. South Carolina argued for states' rights by saying: 
The people of South Carolina may, on the exercise of their 
judgment, based on a first-hand knowledge of local condi­
tions, decide that the state objective of free public 
education is best served by a system consisting of 
separate schools for white and colored children J" 
The Court handed down a unanimous decision on May 17, 1954. 
The opinion was written by Chief Justice Earl Warren. He introduced 
the decision with a brief history of the case and the background of 
the case. The issue of the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
addressed by Chief Justice Warren when he stated: 
It covered, exhaustively, consideration of the Amendment in 
Congress, ratification by the states, then existing 
practices in racial segregation, and the views of the pro­
ponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion 
and our own investigation convince us that, although these 
sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the 
problem with tfbjch we are faced. At best, they are 
inconclusive.'26 
Chief Justice Warren referred to the condition of Southern 
education at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption as the 
123 Stockard, The United States Supreme Court and the Legal 
Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation, p. 51. 
124 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, p. 265. 
125 
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reason that education was not mentioned in the Fourteenth Amend-
mn . 127 ment. 
Plessy, as well as the six cases that followed Plessy involving 
the "separate but equal" doctrine, were discussed in the decision. 
These cases, along with the graduate school cases, had failed to 
reexamine the doctrine. Mr. Warren summarized the Court's position by 
saying: 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 
1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when 
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public 
education in the light of its full development and its 
present place in American life throughout the nation. Only 
in this way can it be determined if segregation in public 
schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection 
laws.'28 
ing: 
of the 
The decision further spoke of the value of education by stat 
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. 
Chief Justice Warren then addressed the fundamental question 
by asking: 
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the 
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 
"tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of 
the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We 
believe that it does J 30 
127Ibid., P- 490. 
128Ibid., P- 492. 
129Ibid., P- 493. 
130Ibid. 
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The doctrine of "separate but equal" as decided in Plessy was 
then rejected by Justice Warren: 
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge 
at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply 
supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. 
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected. We conclude 
that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.'31 
The plans of many Southern school boards to build and improve all-
black schools to make them equal was put to rest by this decision. 
Finally, Justice Warren stated: "We have now announced that 
132 such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws." 
An so, a long sought milestone was reached in the effort to 
desegregate the American society. However, there was much left to do 
to make desegregation a reality. The greatest obstacle to a massive ! 
desegregation of American society was overcome in the Brown I 
decision. But the Court had not decided how desegregation was to be 
administered. All cases under Brown I were sent back to district 
133 court for hearing in implementing Brown. 
134 Boiling v. Sharpe was decided the same day as Brown I. This 
was the fifth case targeted by the NAACP and was adjudged as a 
separate suit. It was not encompassed under the umbrella of Brown I 
131 Ibid., pp. 494-495. 
132Ibid., p. 495. 
133 Stockard, The United States Supreme Court and the Legal 
Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation, p. 54. 
134Bol1ing v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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because Brown I dealt with a challenge to states governed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The same issue was not appropriate to Boiling 
since it dealt with the District of Columbia which was governed by the 
United States Congress. Boiling questioned the due process in the 
Fifth Amendment which read: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other­
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in 
time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.'35 
The case had been brought because black children in the 
District of Columbia were excluded from attending an all-white junior 
high school. The case questioned segregation as being unconstitu­
tional in the District of Columbia. The question was raised as to 
whether or not the District of Columbia's school board could legally 
operate a segregated school system. The school board moved for dis­
missal on the grounds that unequal facilities had not been questioned. 
The Supreme Court ruled as follows: 
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to 
any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on 
Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that 
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation.of their liberty in 
violation of the Due Process Clause.1 
135 U.S., Constitution, amend. V. 
136Bol1ing v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 499 (1954). 
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This opinion caused the Boiling case to be placed for reargument along 
with the other four cases of Brown I. 
Several states began to desegregate soon after the Brown I 
decision. Arkansas, Maryland, Missouri, West Virginia, Delaware, 
Arizona, New Mexico, and the District of Columbia took action to at 
least partially desegregate their school systems. Litigation was set 
off throughout the South as local school boards were petitioned to 
137 desegregate their all-white schools. 
Reargument of Brown was ordered by the Supreme Court in order 
to determine what kind of decree the Court should issue. Chief 
Justice Earl Warren made clear the implications of Brown by stating: 
These cases were decided on May 17, 1954. The opinions 
of that date, declaring the fundamental principle that 
racial discrimination in public education is unconstitu­
tional, are incorporated herein by reference. All pro­
visions of federal, state or local law requiring or 
permitting such discrimination must yield to this 
principle.!38 
One of the questions to be answered was who would carry out 
the order. Justice Warren discussed this by saying: 
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may 
require solution of varied local school problems. School 
authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, 
assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to 
consider whether the action of school authorities consti-r 
tutes good faith in the implementation of the governing 
Constitutional principles 
137 Peter M. Bergman, The Chronological History of the Negro in 
America (New York: The New American Library, 1969), p. 536. 
^^Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 298 (1955). 
139Ibid., p. 299. 
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As to the question of when the order was to be carried out, 
the Court directed "that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable 
start toward full compliance . . . ."^0 The Court realized that 
once a start had been made "additional time is necessary to carry 
out the ruling in an effective manner. 
The Court realized the massive undertaking that faced school 
systems in the South. Justice Warren suggested problem areas to be 
considered in the desegregation process. 
To that end, the Court may consider problems related to 
administration, arising from the physical conditions of 
the school plant, the school transportation system, 
personnel, revisions of school districts and attendance 
areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining 
admission to the public school on a nonracial basis, and 
revision of local laws and regulations which may be 
necessary in solving the foregoing problem.142 
The case(s) were then remanded to the district courts for 
implementation consistent with the Court's order. In remanding the 
case to the district courts Justice Warren once again gave con­
sideration to the time element of implementation when he stated: 
The judgments below, except that in the Deleware case, 
are accordingly reversed, and the cases are remanded to 
the district courts to take such proceedings and enter 
such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as 
are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on 
a racially nondiscrimination basis with all deliberate 
speed, the parties to these cases J43 
140Ibid., p. 300. 
142Ibid., pp. 300-301. 
143Ibid., p. 301. 
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Brown II of 1955 had sought relief from Brown I of 1954. But 
the Court held in Brown II that local school authorities have the 
primary responsibility for implementing the Brown I decision. The 
function of the federal courts is to decide whether a school board 
is complying in good faith and to reconcile the public interest in 
orderly and effective transition to constitutional school systems 
with the constitutional requirements themselves. The Court declared 
that a "prompt and reasonable start" toward full compliance must be 
made and compliance must proceed "with all deliberate speed. 
2.4 Summary 
The problem of racial segregation was a reality long before 
the founding of America in 1776. The division of the black and white 
races in domestic and social areas of everyday life in this country 
naturally led to segregation in our public schools. Forced separa­
tion of the races, and domination of the black race by whites through 
the practice of slavery, led to severe anti-black feelings among 
whites which often resulted in outright cruelty. The resulting 
feeling was one of superiority by whites with attempts to keep the 
black race "in its place," often by legal means. 
This racial segregation in America led, in part, to the Civil 
War. The question of whether slavery would be tolerated or not was 
answered with victory by the North. But simple military victory 
could not change generations of conditioning. Desegregation, and 
144 Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 81. 
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the treatment of blacks as equals, was slow to be achieved. The 
prohibition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitu­
tion was only the beginning. 
Several Civil Rights Acts were passed into law in the late 
1860s and early 1870s to protect the rights of blacks. The Four­
teenth Amendment to the Constitution had the effect of restricting 
the ability of states to enact laws that would limit the rights of 
citizens. This Amendment would become very important in the fight 
to desegregate the public schools. In spite of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts, there were many efforts by the 
states to continue a two-race system in America. The period of 1880 
through the early 1900s saw the enactment of many state laws directed 
toward segregation of the black race. These laws came to be referred 
to as "Jim Crow" laws. 
While these laws were challenged, blacks experienced little 
success during this period of time in their efforts to overcome 
segregation. In 1896, in Plessy, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that it was legal for states to require the separation of the 
races in transportation as long as facilities offered to both races 
were equal. This came to be known as the "separate but equal" 
doctrine. This doctrine applied to all areas of life, including 
education. 
The first serious challenge to legal segregation began in the 
1930s with the University School Cases. These cases, brought by the 
NAACP, attacked the 'separate but equal" doctrine at the professional 
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school level of state universities. While the "separate but equal" 
doctrine was actually upheld in these cases, the prohibitive cost 
of equal facilities on the graduate school level led to desegrega­
tion at this level. 
In 1950 the effort to gain admission of black students to 
all-white public schools became a national issue. Four cases were 
joined in the famous Brown decision(s) of 1954 and 1955. These 
suits were based on the belief that black schools were inferior to 
white schools. The Court ruled that separate schools for the races 
could not be equal and ordered the dismantling of segregated school 
systems. The stage was set for massive resistance by states in the 
South. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF BUSING 
FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
3.1. Introduction. 
3.2. Desegregation of Public Schools in the South. 
3.3. The Use of Busing for Desegregation. 
3.4. Implications for De Facto Segregation. 
3.5. A Possible Return to Neighborhood Schools. 
3.6. Summary. 
3.1 Introduction 
The Supreme Court developed the law governing school desegre­
gation in a series of historic cases, beginning with Brown I of 1954 
and running through Keyes v. School District No. 1 in 1973. The 
resulting doctrine concerning desegregation is, briefly, this: 
Racial imbalance among public school students violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it 
results from policies, decisions, and acts of public 
officials carried out with intent to produce segregation 
(de jure segregation), but not if it results solely from 
demographic patterns (de facto segregation). A school 
system that is found by a court to have engaged in de jure 
segregation must take affirmative steps to eliminate its 
dual system and convert to a "unitary system in which 
racial discrimination is eliminated root and branch" (as 
the high court wrote in 1968 in Green v. County School 
Board).145 
145 Benjamin Sendor, "These Two Cases Raise Key Questions (But 
Offer Ambiguous Answers) About School Desegregation," The American 
School Board Journal, January 1987, p. 12. 
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Brown II of 1955 reviewed and refined Brown I of 1954. However, 
the United States Supreme Court in Brown II remanded the cases to 
the federal district courts and charged the local school boards with 
the burden of instituting plans to desegregate. The Court required 
1 
the local boards to proceed with "all deliberate speed." 
"All deliberate speed" became the catchword that spawned 
massive resistance as the South deliberated but refused to desegre­
gate. Ten years after Brown I, only 1.2 percent of nearly three 
million black students in eleven Southern states attended school with 
147 white students. During this ten-year period a large number of 
cases were considered that reinforced the requirements of Brown. 
Several of these reached the Supreme Court. 
School boards and state legislatures in the South attempted to 
circumvent the legal requirements to desegregate with differing 
methods. Price Edward County, Virginia, tried to solve the segrega­
tion problem by simply abolishing its public schools. Other school 
districts found less dramatic ways to temporarily circumvent the law. 
Chief among these methods was the "freedom of choice" plan that 
permitted students to select the school they would attend. 
As lower courts, and eventually the Supreme Court, considered 
cases arising from attempts to circumvent desegregation, it became 
evident that strong action must be taken if desegregation of the 
146 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, p. 300. 
147 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Twenty Years After Brown: 
Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1975), p. 46. 
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public schools was to be achieved. The stage was set for the next 
era in the desegregation of America's public schools. A tool that 
had long been used for the purpose of continuing segregation would 
help drive the final nail in the coffin of segregation. Busing for 
racial consideration was to become the focus of this continuing 
process. 
3.2 Desegregation of Public Schools in the South 
Four years after the Supreme Court of the United States 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the school bell 
summoned America to the spectacle of screaming parents 
and troops with bayonets at the ready, escorting nine 
black students to Central High School in Little Rock, 
Arkansas. 
"I tried to see a friendly face," declared Elizabeth 
Eckford, one of the nine. "I looked into the face of an 
old woman and it seemed friendly, but when I looked at her 
again she spat on me." And then Elizabeth Eckford weptJ^8 
Efforts by the state government of Arkansas to refuse to obey 
a federal court order led to the incident described in this quote 
from Elizabeth Eckford. This attempt to disobey a federal court 
149 order was answered in the case of Cooper v. Aaron. The case drew 
national attention when nine black students sought to integrate 
Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. 
148 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Fulfilling the Letter and 
Spirit of the Law: Desegregation of the Nation's Public Schools, 
p. 1. 
149 
Cooper, Members of the Board of Directors of the Little 
Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 
(1958). 
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The school board of Little Rock had taken action to adopt a 
new school board policy that would carry out the intent of Brown I. 
In the meantime the Arkansas state constitution had been amended by 
state authorities to oppose the action of the Supreme Court in 
150 
Brown I and Brown II. 
The plan that had been adopted by the school board was to 
phase in school integration beginning in 1957 with complete desegre­
gation by 1963. The plan would (1) initiate integration on the 
senior high school level, (2) integrate the junior high schools 
later, and (3) integrate the elementary schools immediately.^ 
Blacks in Little Rock wanted a more immediate schedule for integra­
tion and sought relief in the District Court and the Eighth Circuit 
159 
Court of Appeals. Both courts upheld the school board's plan. 
In the fall of 1957, when Little Rock Central High School 
opened for the school year, nine black students appeared to enroll. 
Governor Orval Faubus had dispatched the Arkansas National Guard to 
153 prevent integration. The Guard was removed after three weeks 
when the district court and the attorney general enjoined Governor 
Faubus and the National Guard from preventing the enrollment of the 
black students. The nine black students entered the high school on 
September 23 but withdrew due to the appearance of a very hostile 
l fjn 
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crowd. Federal troops were ordered to the high school by President 
Dwight Eisenhower. These federal troops remained at the high school 
to maintain peace for two weeks. President Eisenhower then federal­
ized the Arkansas National Guard and placed the troops at the school 
154 for the school year. 
Removal of black students at Central High School and a post­
ponement of the desegregation plan was requested by the school board. 
Relief was granted by the District Court, but the decision was 
reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court 
heard the case in special session. At issue in this case was whether 
the governor and state legislature must obey federal court orders. 
155 In this case the federal court order was Brown I. 
The Court's decision was delivered by Chief Justice Warren 
who stated: 
The conditions they depict are directly traceable to the 
action of legislators and executive officials of the 
State of Arkansas, taken in their official capacities, 
which reflect their own determination to resist this 
Court's decision in the Brown case, and which have brought 
about violent resistance to the decision in Arkansas.156 
. . . the Constitutional rights of children are not to be 
discriminated against in school admission on grounds of 
race or color declared by this Court in the Brown case and 
can neither be nullified openly and directly by state 
legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor 
Nolte, School Law in Action, 101 Key Decisions, p. 207. 
155Ibid. 
156 
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nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for 
segregation . . . .'57 
High schools in Little Rock were closed for the 1858-59 school 
year by Governor Faubus to prevent "violence and disorder." The 
schools were reopened after the school closing laws were declared 
158 unconstitutional by a federal court. 
In Goss another attempt to circumvent the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Brown was addressed. The school board in Knoxville, 
Tennessee, proposed a desegregation plan which provided for the 
rezoning of school districts without reference to race. The plan 
also contained a transfer provision under which any student would be 
permitted, solely on the basis of the student's race and the racial 
composition of the school to which the student was assigned by virtue 
of rezoning, to transfer from such a school where the student would 
be in the racial minority back to the student's former school. The 
transfer provisions clearly worked to move students in one direction, 
across racially neutral zoning lines and back into segregated 
schools J5® 
In Goss v. Board of Education of the City of Knoxville, 
1 cn 
Tennessee, black students challenged the validity of Knoxville's 
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desegregation plan. The case was decided, in 1963, with the Court's 
opinion delivered by Justice Tom C. Clark. Justice Clark stated the 
findings of the Court based on Brown II; 
The transfer plans, being based solely on racial factors, 
which under their terms, inevitably lead toward segregation 
of the students by race, we conclude that they run counter 
to the admonition of Brown v. Board of Education, wherein 
the District Court was directed to "consider the adequacy 
of any plan" proposed by school authorities "to effectuate 
a racially nondiscriminatory school system" Our conclusion 
here leads to reversal of the judgments of the Court of 
Appeals to the extent they approve the transfer provision 
of respondent boards in each of the cases. The only ques­
tion with which we are here concerned relates solely to 
the transfer provisions and we are not called upon either 
to discuss or to pass on the other provisions of the 
desegregation plan.16' 
Justice Clark expressed concern about the plan operating with 
transfer procedures based on race: 
It is readily apparent that the transfer system proposal 
lends itself to perpetuation of segregation . . . .While 
transfers are available to those who choose to attend 
school where their race is in the majority, there is no 
provision whereby a student might transfer upon request to 
a school in which his race is in a minority, unless he 
qualifies for "a good course" transfer .... This Court 
has decided that state-imposed separation in public schools 
is inherently unequal, and results in discrimination in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment J62 
Justice Clark then looked at the major issue of the case and 
gave indication of what type guidelines would be acceptable to the 
Court: 
Our task then is to decide whether these transfer provisions 
are likewise unconstitutional. In doing so, we note that 
161 Ibid., p. 684-685. 
162Ibid., p. 683. 
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if the transfer provisions were made available to all 
students regardless of the racial composition of the 
school to which they requested transfer, we woule 
have an entirely different case. Pupils could then, 
at their option, (or that of their parents) choose, 
entirely free of any imposed racial consideration, to 
remain in the school of their zone or to transfer to 
another J 63 
Thus, in Goss, transfer plans were found unconstitutional if 
they were based on race. The guidelines that were given by the 
Court stated that transfer provisions must be made available to all 
students regardless of race and social composition of the intended 
school. The Court was actually saying that a transfer plan which 
used social factors in the operation deprived black students of their 
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. While Goss 
found transfer plans based on race inappropriate, it left open the 
door for the development of desegregation plans that would be based 
on a "freedom of choice" transfer plan. 
Perhaps the most extreme effort to circumvent the Court's 
ruling in Brown occurred in Prince Edward County, Virginia. Brown I 
had held that Virginia school segregation laws were unconstitutional 
and ordered that black students in Price Edward County be admitted to 
the public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. Faced with 
the order to desegregate, the county school board refused, in 1959, 
to appropriate funds for the operation of public schools. However, 
tax credits were given for contributions to private white schools. 
The students in private schools became eligible for county and state 
163Ibid., p. 687. 
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tuition grants in 1960. Public schools continued to operate elsewhere 
in Virginia. The federal district court ordered the reopening of the 
164 public schools. The case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals where it was reversed on grounds that the District Court 
should have abstained in order to wait for a state court's determina-
165 tion concerning the validity of tuition grants. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard 
argument on March 30, 1964 of Griffin v. County School Board of Prince 
1 
Edward County. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion. 
Justice Black dealt with the position of the Court by stating: 
For reasons to be stated, we agree with the District Court 
that, under the circumstances here, closing the Prince 
Edward County Schools, while public schools in all the 
other counties of Virginia were being maintained, denied 
the petitioners and the class of Negro students they 
represent the equal protection of the law guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.'6 
Justice Black addressed the question of local or state 
responsibility in actually closing the Prince Edward County Schools 
by stating: 
While a holding as to the constitutional duty of the 
Supervisor and other officials of Prince Edward County 
may have repercussions over the State and may require the 
District Court's orders to run to parties outside the 
county; it is, nevertheless, true that what is attacked 
164 Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 83. 
^6Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 
377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
167Ibid., p. 225. 
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in the suit is not something which the State had commanded 
Pri rce Edward County to do—close its public schools and 
give grants to children in private schools—but rather 
something which the county with state acquiescence and 
cooperation has undertaken to do on its own volition, 
decision not binding on any other county in Virginia . . . 
We hold that the single District Judge did not err in 
adjudicating the present controversy J 68 
Justice Black stated the real reason for closing the county 
schools as: 
. . .  t o  e n s u r e ,  t h r o u g h  m e a s u r e s  t a k e n  b y  t h e  c o u n t y  a n d  
the State, that white and colored children in Prince 
Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go to 
the same school.169 
The reasons for closing the schools were found to be a denial 
of equal protection. Justice Black stated in reference to this: 
Whatever nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing 
a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a 
constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to 
segregation do not qualify as constitutional.''0 
The Court's findings were clarified further by Justice Black 
when he discussed the question of the decree for implementing the 
Court's judgment especially in regard to the question of financial 
support: 
. . . relief needs to be quick and effective .... The 
Board of Supervisors has the special responsibility to levy 
local taxes to operate public schools or to aid children 
attending the private schools now functioning there for 
white children. The District Court enjoined the county 
officials from paying county tuition grants or giving tax 
168Ibid., p. 228. 
169 
Ibid., p. 231. 
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exemptions and from processing applications for state 
tuition grants so long as the county's public schools 
remained closed J 71 
. . . the District Court may, if necessary to prevent further 
racial discrimination, require the Supervisors to exercise 
the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds ade­
quate to reopen, operate, and maintain, without racial 
discrimination, a public school system in Prince Edward 172 
County like that operated in other counties in Virginia. 
Justice Black closed the opinion by stating: 
The time for mere "deliberate speed" has run out, and that 
phrase can no longer justify denying these Prince Edward 
County school children their constitutional rights to an 
education equal to that afforded by the public schools in 
the other parts of Virginia.173 
In 1965 the growing impatience of the Supreme Court, caused 
by the many attempts to circumvent desegregation, was illustrated in 
174 the case of Rogers v. Paul. This case dealt with a desegregation 
plan adopted by the Fort Smith, Arkansas, school board. The plan 
175 adopted was a "grade a year" plan. 
The 1957 Arkansas plan integrated the schools one grade each 
year. By 1964 all grades except ten, eleven, and twelve were inte­
grated. Class action litigation was initiated by two black students. 
They challenged the integration plan on two factors: (1) the plan 
had not been followed; and (2) after seven years, grades ten, eleven, 
171 Ibid., p. 232. 
172Ibid., p. 233. 
173Ibid., p. 234. 
174Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965). 
175 
Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
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and twelve in high school were still not desegregated. The black 
students attended a high school which did not have the range of 
courses offered at the white high school. The Court ruled as 
follows: 
. . . Petitioners and those similarly situated shall be 
allowed immediate transfer to the high school that has 
the more extensive curriculum and from which they are 
excluded because of race.'76 
Rogers illustrated the growing impatience of the Court con­
cerning the implementation of Brown I. Some questions concerning 
compliance with "all deliberate speed" were left unanswered in this 
decision.^ 
By 1968 some thirteen hundred school systems in the South were 
using some form of "freedom of choice" desegreation plans. These 
plans were another attempt to slow down the process of integration 
178 as much as an individual county would allow. In that year, three 
separate cases were heard by the United States Supreme Court. These 
cases were similar, and though they were not joined, the facts of 
the three were much the same. The cases came from Arkansas, Virginia, 
and Tennessee. Two of the cases concerned "freedom of choice" 
179 assignments and the third had a free choice plan. 
^6Rogers v. Paul, p. 199. 
177 Stockard, The United States Supreme Court and the Legal 
Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation, p. 73. 
17ft 
Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record, p. 456. 
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Green v. County School Board of New Kent County came to the 
Supreme Court on appeal from the Fourth Circuit in Virginia. The New 
Kent County school system in Virginia was serving about 1 ,300 students 
approximately half of whom were black. There was no residential 
segregation in the county and persons of both races resided through­
out. The school system had only two schools, one for whites and one 
for blacks. Each school served the whole county and 21 buses traveled 
overlapping routes in order to transport students to segregated 
classes. 
In 1965, the school board, in order to remain eligible for 
federal financial aid, adopted a "freedom of choice" plan for desegre­
gating the schools. The plan permitted students, except those 
entering first and eighth grades, to choose annually between schools. 
Those not choosing were assigned to the school they had previously 
attended. First and eighth graders had to choose a school. 
During the plan's three years of operation no white student 
had chosen to attend the all-black school, and although 115 blacks 
had enrolled in the formerly all-white school, eighty-five percent of 
the black students in the system still attended the all-black school. 
The adequacy of this desegregation plan was challenged in this 
^Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 
430 (1968). 
1 81 Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 85. 
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Justice William J. Brennan delivered the Court's majority 
opinion. He first discussed the question before the Court: 
The question for decision is whether, under all circum­
stances here, respondent School Board's adoption of 
"freedom-of-choice" plan which allows a pupil to choose 
his own public school constitutes adequate compliance 
with the Board's responsibility "to achieve a system of 
determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial 
basis."182 
Again, the Court's impatience with Southern school systems was 
displayed as Justice Brennan spoke of the delays of the school board 
in carrying out Brown I' s  m a n d a t e :  
In determining whether respondent School Board met that 
command by adopting the "freedom-of-choice" plan, it is 
relevant that this first step did not come until some 
eleven years after Brown I was decided, and ten years 
after Brown II directed the making of a "prompt and 
reasonable start.11 This deliberate perpetuation of the 
unconstitutional dual system can only have compounded the 
harm of such a system. Such delays are no longer tolerable, 
for "the governing constitutional principles no longer bear 
the imprint of the new enunciated doctrine."183 
While the Court did not find the "freedom of choice" plans 
completely unconstitutional, Justice Brennan suggested: 
We do not hold that "freedom-of-choice" can have no 
place . . . We do not hold that a "freedom-of-choice" plan 
might of itself be unconstitutional, although that argu­
ment has been urged upon us. Rather, all we decide today 
is that in desegregating a dual system, a plan utilizing 
"freedom-of-choice" is not an end in itself 
182 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, p. 431. 
183Ibid., p. 438. 
184Ibid., pp. 439-440. 
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In regard to the New Kent County situation Justice Brennan 
gave the following order: 
The New Kent County School Board's "freedom-of-choice" plan 
cannot be accepted as a sufficient step to "effectuate a 
transition" to a unitary system ... In other words the 
school system remains a dual system. Rather than the 
further dismantling of the dual system, the plan has 
operated simply to burden children and their parents with 
a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the 
School Board. The Board must be required to formulate a 
new plan . . . The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
vacated in so far as it affirmed the District Court, and 
the case is remanded to the District Court for further pro­
ceedings consistent with this opinion.'*" 
In practice, few students chose to transfer schools under 
"freedom of choice" plans. The Court had addressed this in Green, 
ruling that such plans were unacceptable where speedier and more 
I OC 
effective means were available. The Court stated that "the burden 
of a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises 
187 realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." 
188 Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School District 
was decided on the same day as Green. This was another "freedom of 
choice" case but was from a school district in Arkansas. The school 
system of Gould, Arkansas, contained a black population of about 
sixty percent. The school system provided two combination elementary 
185Ibid., p. 441. 
1 fifi 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Fulfilling the Letter and 
Spirit of the Law, p. 4. 
"187 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, p. 439. 
188 Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School District, 
391 U.S. 443 (1968). 
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and high schools approximately ten blocks apart in the district's only 
major town. The school system had been totally segregated until 1965. 
Again, as in Green, this action was taken in order for the school 
system to remain eligible for federal financial aid. The plan 
required all students to choose a school annually. Those not desiring 
to choose a school were assigned to the school they previously 
attended.^ 
By 1967 no white students had chosen the all-black Fields 
School. Eighty-five blacks had enrolled in the previously all-white 
Gould School. The number of students requesting to attend the Gould 
School soon exceeded the number of places available. Due to the 
absence of space, twenty-eight black students were refused admit­
tance.^® 
Black students being required to attend the all-black Fields 
School sought injunctive relief. During this time the school board 
announced plans to build a new high school at Fields. Petitioners 
sought to enjoin construction and argued that the school should be 
191 built at the Gould site instead of at the Fields site. 
The District Court denied relief on the basis that: (1) the 
"freedom of choice" plan had been adopted without court action; 
(2) the plan had received approval by the Department of Health, 
189Ibid., p. 445. 
190Ibid., p. 446. 
191Ibid. 
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Education, and Welfare; and (3) some blacks had enrolled in the Gould 
192 schools. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals where 
193 the plan and its implementation was found to be adequate. 
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court. 
Justice William J. Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court concern­
ing the adequacy of the "freedom of choice" plan. Justice Brennan 
stated: 
. . . The question of the adequacy of "freedom-of-choice" is 
properly before us. On the merits, our decision in Green v. 
County School Board, supra, establishes that the plan is 
inadequate to convert to a unitary, nonracial school system. 
As in Green, the "school system remains a dual system." 
. . . The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and 
the case is remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with our opinion in Green v. County 
School Board J 94 
The third and final case relating to "freedom of choice" 
desegregation plans was Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of the City 
195 of Jackson. This Tennessee case involved the city of Jackson's 
school system. Some forty percent of the student population was 
black. In an effort to desegregate its elementary and junior high 
school systems, the City of Jackson instituted a "free-transfer" 
plan. This plan permitted a child, after registering in the stu­
dent's assigned school in the proper attendance zone, to transfer 
193Ibid., p. 447. 
194Ibid., p. 449. 
^Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of the City of Jackson, 
391 U.S. 450 (1968). 
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freely to another school -of the student's choice if space were avail­
able. After three years of operation of the plan, the one black 
junior high school in the system was still completely black, one of 
the two white junior high schools was still almost white, and three 
of the eight elementary schools were still attended only by blacks. 
The black children challenged the adequacy of this plan and of the 
school board's efforts to meet its responsibility to effect a transi-
196 tion to a unitary school system. 
The school board proposed new zones for the three junior high 
schools, but petitioners objected because of alleged racially gerry­
mandered zones that failed to provide a nonracial system. The 
District Court insisted that petitioners had not proven their allega­
tions that proposed junior high attendance zones were indeed gerry-
197 
mandered. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court. 
Justice William J. Brennan delivered the opinion which stated in 
part: 
The principles governing determination of the adequacy of 
the plan as in compliance with the Board's responsibility 
to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory 
system are those announced today in Green v. County School 
Board, supra, tested by those principles, the plan is 
clearly inadequate.'98 
196 Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
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Justice Brennan then spoke directly concerning the "free-
transfer" plan by relying on Green: 
We do not hold that "free-transfer" can have no place in a 
desegregation plan. But like "freedom-of-choice," if it 
cannot be shown that such a plan will further, rather than 
delay, conversion to a unitary, nonracial, nondiscriminatory 
school system, it must be held unacceptable .... 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated inso­
far as it affirmed the District Court's approval of the plan 
in its application to the junior high schools, and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion in Green v. County School Board, supra J 99 
The 1969 United States v. Montgomery County Board of Educa­
tion case was the last decision concerning desegregation that was 
handed down by the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice 
Earl Warren. This case involved a plea to desegregate a school 
faculty in Montgomery County, Alabama. Evidence showed that the 
state had made no effort for ten years to integrate the public 
201 schools. The action was begun in 1964 by black children and their 
parents in an attempt to dismantle the dual system in Montgomery and 
to stop assigning faculty to schools on the basis of race. 
A local federal district judge ordered integration of certain 
grades to begin in September 1964. This resulted in eight black stu­
dents being transferred to white schools. There were approximately 
202 
15,000 black students in the 40,000 student school system. The 
1 "ibid.» pp. 459-460. 
^°United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 
U.S. 225 (1969). 
?m 
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1964 order also required an annual report to be made to the court 
annually. These annual records revealed an increasing recognition 
of the intent of the local school board to desegregate, even though 
203 more rapid progress could have been made. 
A 1968 order involved the desegregation of the school faculty 
at Jefferson Davis High School. The court-mandated goal required 
the school board to attain a uniform ratio of five to one (white to 
black) faculty members in each school in the system.^ The Court 
of Appeals modified the District Court's order of systemwide five to 
one faculty ratio. The new order struck down that part of the order 
that set a specific goal and modified it to provide for "substantially 
205 or approximately" the five to one ratio earlier decreed. The ratio 
was eliminated. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the ruling by the Court of 
Appeals. Justice Black held that: 
The modifications ordered by the panel of the Court of 
Appeals, while of course not intended to do so, would, we 
think take from the order some of the capacity to expedite, 
by means of specific commands, the day when a completely 
unified, unitary, nondiscriminatory school system becomes 
a reality instead of a hope.206 
The orders of the District Court were to stand. 
204 United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 
p. 232. 
205Ibid., p.. 234. 
206Ibid., p. 235. 
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Justice Black stated that "we do not . . . argue here that 
racially balanced faculties are constitutionally or legally 
207 required." He noted that both parties to the case were interested 
in desegregating the schools; in this case it was simply a matter of 
determining to what degree. The real interest of the Supreme Court 
was in assuring that the spirit and intention of the Brown decisions 
be followed.208 
209 Alexander v. Holmes demonstrated the growing impatience of 
the Supreme Court with "all deliberate speed." In this case the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had granted a motion for additional 
time and delayed implementation of an earlier order mandating desegre­
gation in thirty-three Mississippi school districts. These districts 
210 served thousands of students. This delay was challenged in this 
case. 
The case was argued before the Supreme Court in October of 
1969. The decision was unanimous. Justice Black, in delivering the 
opinion of the court, stated: 
The Court of Appeals order of August 28, 1967, is vacated, 
and the case is remanded to that Court to issue its decree 
and order, effective immediately, declaring that each of 
207Ibid., p. 236. 
208Hudgins, The Warren Court, p. 94. 
209 
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 
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the school districts here involved may no longer operate 
a dual school system based on race or color, and directing 
that they begin immediately to operate, as unitary, school 
systems within which no person is to be effectively 
excluded from any school because of race or color.211 
The Court stated in this case that delay could no longer be 
tolerated and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals must order immediate 
desegregation of the school districts. Modifications of and objec­
tions to the order could be considered while the order was being 
212 implemented, but the implementation could not be delayed. The 
Alexander decision made two positions of the Supreme Court known. 
First, the Court emphasized that the time for desegregation was now. 
Second, the Court stated that the District Courts must maintain con­
trol of desegregation cases until a unitary school system had been 
achieved. 
It was becoming very clear that the Supreme Court expected the 
immediate desegregation of public school systems in the South. The 
lower courts were expected to see that the Brown decisions were 
implemented fully. This expectation of the Supreme Court was shown 
once again in the case of Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School 
Board.213 
Soon after the Court in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of 
Education vacated a lower court order granting a three-month delay 
211 Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, p. 20. 
212 Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 87. 
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in desegregation and mandated immediate action, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate 
214 School District. This case was a consolidation of sixteen major 
school cases and involved hundreds of thousands of school children. 
The decision was handed down in December of 1969. The Fifth Circuit 
was reluctant to require that these children be relocated in the 
middle of the school year. It required the desegregation of facul­
ties, facilities, activities, staff, and transportation no later 
than February 1, 1970. Integration of student bodies was delayed 
215 until the beginning of the next school year. 
The United States Supreme Court considered the case on 
certiorari. Chief Justice Warren Burger's opinion stated: 
Insofar as the Court of Appeals authorized deferral of stu­
dent desegregation beyond February 1, 1970, that Court 
misconstrued our holdings in Alexander v. Holmes County 
Board of Education . . . Accordingly, the petitions for 
writs of certiorari are granted, the judgments of the 
Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cases remanded to 
that Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. The judgments in these cases are to issue forth­
with. 216 
Although this decision was on a vote of six to two, it rein­
forced further the determination of the Court to immediately imple­
ment desegregation plans. 
214 Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 
419 F. 2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969). 
215 Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
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Two months after the Alexander decision, the case of 
Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis, Tennessee, City 
217 Schools came to the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted 
certiorari. This case dealt with a May, 1969, District Court order 
that required the Memphis School Board to submit a desegregation plan 
based on geographic assignment. This plan was to be submitted by 
January of 1970.^® 
The plaintiffs in the District Court case believed, based on 
the Supreme Court's ruling in Alexander, that there should be a 
greater emphasis on the speed of desegregation. The District Court 
disagreed with this argument and required only the geographic plan by 
the January date. The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals and, at the same time, moved for an injunction to direct 
the District Court to order a plan for operating the Memphis schools 
219 as a unitary system during the current 1969-70 school year. 
The Sixth Circuit Court affirmed the denial that asked for 
further relief. The court also, at the same time, denied the injunc­
tion requested. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court 
held that the Court of Appeals had erred in denying relief. But the 
217 Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis, Tennessee, 
City Schools, 397 U.S. 232 (1970). 
218 Stockard, The United States Supreme Court and the Legal 
Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation, p. 86. 
219 Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis, Tennessee, 
City Schools, p. 234. 
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Court declined to reverse the Sixth Circuit Court's denial of the 
. . 220 injunction. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger urged in his concurrence of the 
Court opinion, that some "basic practical problems" concerning the 
requirement of a "unitary system" must be resolved. He said: 
. . .  A s  s o o n  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  h o w e v e r ,  w e  o u g h t  t o  r e s o l v e  s o m e  
of the basic practical problems when they are appropriately 
presented, including whether, as a constitutional matter, 
any particular racial balances must be achieved in the 
schools; to what extent school districts and zones may or 
must be altered as a constitutional matter; and to what 
extent transportation may or must be provided by prior 2?i 
holdings of the Court. Other related issues may emerge. 
3.3 The Use of Busing for Desegregation 
In many Southern states school boards were able to easily 
solve the desegregation problem because of the rural nature of the 
South. In many cases these rural school systems had only two schools, 
one all-white and one all-black. Desegregation was accomplished by 
simply closing the all-black school and transferring the black stu­
dents to the all-white school, or by simply exhanging black students 
222 for white students in the two schools. 
Metropolitan school systems faced a far more complex problem 
because there were large pockets of minorities located in inner city 
areas. These areas existed as they did, not because of any laws, 
220Ibid., p. 234. 
221 Ibid., p. 237. 
222 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, p. 430. 
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statutes, or actions of officials, but simply because housing patterns 
had developed in this manner. However, officials in large metropoli­
tan school systems had often gerrymandered attendance lines to main­
tain segregated schools. The existence of these circumstances in 
Northern and Western school systems made it evident that the problem 
223 of desegregation extended outside the South. 
The Supreme Court was growing more and more impatient with the 
speed of the desegregation process. The Court began to force school 
boards to look for a means of implementing the desegregation process 
that would be more effective than the methods that were being used. 
Busing was a solution that was apparent to many people. Busing was 
simply the process of using a school system's transportation system 
to join students from a majority race with students from a minority 
224 race. The solution was not new because rural sections of the 
United States had used buses to transport students to consolidated 
225 schools for many years. 
Busing had also been been used in other school systems for 
differing reasons. Following World War II there had been a tremen­
dous increase in the number of public school students. Student 
enrollment had exceeded the rate of school construction. Busing had 
been used to transport students into less crowded schools. One 
223 "Testing Time for Busing," Newsweek, September 8, 1975, 
p. 79. 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 
1 (1970). 
225Ibid., p. 4. 
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example of this was in St. Louis, Missouri, where buses were used to 
ppfZ 
shift students to schools with fewer pupils. This plan had been 
implemented effectively as an alternative to the establishment of 
double shifts that otherwise would have had students divided into 
morning and afternoon groups. 
School administrators had argued for decades that the use of 
227 busing could help achieve quality education. This argument dealt 
quite often with attempts to consolidate small high schools into one 
larger and more comprehensive high school. This argument focused on 
providing a school that could compete with schools in the cities. 
There were, of course, objections to the use of the school bus. The 
most common objections to busing were: (1) length of time students 
spent on the bus; (2) distance traveled; and (3) safety and cost of 
busing.228 
Prior to 1954, Southern states had bused students literally as 
229 a means of segregating the schools. A dual bus system, one for 
white students and one for black students, operated in most Southern 
states. These buses often both operated on the same streets and 
^Nicholas Mills, "Busing: Who's Being Taken For a Ride?1', 
Commonweal, March 24, 1972, p. 4. 
227Ibid., p. 7. 
228Ibid., p. 8. 
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highways. Black students were often transported past all-white 
230 schools en route to the all-black schools and vice versa. 
Busing had been used to successfully desegregate the schools 
in some areas of the country. The Berkeley, California, school 
system was the first city to achieve full desegregation by busing in 
231 1968. Other cities such as Galveston, Texas, Oklahoma City, and 
Pontiac, Michigan, began utilizing busing to desegregate following 
232 the success in Berkeley. 
The use of busing had been suggested in earlier court cases. 
233 Judge J. Shelly Wriqht in Hobsen v. Hansen in 1967 had suggested 
the use of busing as a means of desegregating school systems located 
in large cities. 
But how far would the Court go in requiring that busing be 
used to desegregate the schools? There was much speculation about 
the limits of court ordered busing until this question was answered 
234 by the United States Supreme Court in the Swann decision. In this 
landmark case the Supreme Court insisted that cross-district busing 
could indeed be instituted in order to desegregate the public 
school s.23*' 
230Ibid. 
231 Ibid., p. 321 
232Ibid. 
233Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967). 
234 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, p. 1. 
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Before looking in detail at the Swann decision, it is important 
to remember that the position of the United States Supreme Court had 
changed between 1954 and 1969. It had changed from one of prohibiting 
de jure segregation to one of requiring integration. 
poc 
The questions that Chief Justice Burger raised in Northcross 
were answered, in part, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
237 Education. Those questions concerned: (1) constitutional matters 
of racial balance; (2) alteration of school districts; and (3) the 
extent of transportation. 
Swann dealt with the question of compulsory integration of a 
school system in order to dismantle the dual system that existed. 
Central to the case was a desegregation plan that was based on geo­
graphic zoning with a free-transfer plan. Initial approval had been 
given to the plan by the DistrictCourt in 1965. A petition seeking 
238 further relief, based on the Court's ruling in Green, was filed in 
September of 1968. Both the plaintiffs and the school board agreed 
that the present plan did not fully achieve the required unitary 
school system. The school board was ordered to develop a plan to 
239 include student and faculty desegregation. 
Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis, Tennessee, 
City Schools, p. 237. 
237 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, p. 1. 
238 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, p. 430. 
239 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, p. 9. 
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Examination in 1969 revealed that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
school system was the forty-third largest school system in the nation. 
The system contained over 84,000 students in 107 schools. The school 
district was a combined system which included the entire county as 
well as the city of Charlotte. Twenty-nine percent of the students 
were black and concentrated in the city. Fourteen thousand black 
students were enrolled in twenty-one schools that were either totally 
240 or more than ninety-nine percent black. 
The school board had submitted two different plans; one in 
June, 1969, and one again in August, 1969. The court ordered that a 
third plan be developed. After much prodding, the school board pre­
sented only a partially complete plan. In light of the board's 
failure to comply with the court's mandate, District Court Judge 
James McMillan appointed Dr. John Finger, an expert in educational 
administration,.to prepare a desegregation plan for the court. The 
"Finger Plan," as finally presented, was extremely controversial in 
its method of dealing with the desegregation of the junior and senior 
241 high schools, and it aroused heated local debates. 
In February, 1970, the District Court was presented a "board 
plan" and the "Finger Plan." The board plan with modifications was 
adopted by the District Court. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court 
2^°Frank T. Read, "Judicial Evolution of the Law of School 
Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education," in The Courts, Social 
Science, and School Desegregation, ed. Betsy Levin and W. C. Hawley 
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1975), p. 34. 
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affirmed the District Court's order, in part, and vacated, in part. 
The case was then remanded to the District Court for reconsideration. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ordered rein­
statement of the District Court order. 
On remand, the District Court was presented with two new plans. 
After lengthy hearings, Judge McMillan concluded that the "Finger 
Plan" was acceptable. The District Court then ordered the school 
board to accept one of the three plans or provide a new one. The 
"Finger Plan" was to remain in effect until the school board presented 
a new plan. In August, 1970, the school board gave the court notice 
that it would "acquiesce" to the "Finger Plan," but stated that the 
plan was not reasonable. Judge McMillan then ordered the "Finger 
?&? 
Plan" to remain in effect. 
The majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court was 
delivered by Chief Justice Warren Burger: 
We granted certiorari in this case to review important issues 
as to the duties of school authorities and the scope of 
powers of federal courts under the Court's mandates to 
eliminate racially separate oublic schools established and 
maintained by state action.243 
Chief Justice Burger first addressed the problem of defining 
the "responsibility of school authorities in desegregating a state-
enforced dual school system in light of the Equal Protection 
244 Clause." He explained that this was basically a problem of student 
242 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, p. 11. 
243... . n r Ibid., p. 5. 
244Ibid., p. 18. 
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assignment. In referring to school systems that had been operating 
dual systems, the first obligation of school authorities was to elimi­
nate racial distinctions in transportation, supporting personnel, 
extra curricular activities, maintenance of buildings, and distribu­
tion of equipment. 
Justice Burger's opinion then concentrated on four problems in 
Swarm: 
(1) to what extent racial balance or racial quotas might be 
used as an implement in a remedial order to correct a 
previously segregated system; 
(2) whether every all-Negro and all-white school must be 
eliminated as an indispensable part of a remedial process of 
desegregation; 
(3) what the limits are, if any, on the rearrangement of 
school districts and attendance zones, as a remedial measure; 
and 
(4) what the limits are, if any, on the use of transportation 
facilities to correct state-enforced racial school 
segregation.245 
The District Court's order had addressed the 71-29 percent 
white to black ratio in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools. Justice 
Burger drew heavily on this in addressing the problem of "racial 
balance" or "racial quotas." He cautioned: 
. . .  I f  w e  w e r e  t o  r e a d  t h e  h o l d i n g s  o f  t h e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  
to require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, 
any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that 
approach would be disproved and we would be obliged to 
reverse.246 
According to Justice Burger it was not necessary for the racial 
composition of the community to be reflected in the school system. 
245Ibid., p. 22. 
246Ibid., p. 24. 
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Desegregation could be achieved without this. He insisted that the 
District Court used the mathematical ratio only as a starting point 
247 in formulating a plan, not as a requirement. Justice Burger 
suggested that there were circumstances that caused certain schools 
to be composed of all one race. But he also pointed out that this 
would continue until new schools were built or until neighborhood 
patterns changed. 
In order to break up a dual system, Justice Burger said that 
249 "remedial altering of attendance zones" was to be utilized. Sucy 
practices as gerrymandering school districts and attendance zones, 
as well as pairing, and clustering or grouping of schools might be 
250 used in order to eliminate the all-white and the all-black schools. 
Justice Burger also pointed out that a school system with no history 
of discrimination might assign its pupils to the school nearest their 
homes.2^ 
252 In regard to the "transportation of students" Justice Burger 
said that no rigid guidelines should be given because of the many 
247ibid. 
248Tk. . nr Ibid., p. 25. 
249Ibid., p. 27. 
250Ibid. 
251 Ibid., p. 28. 
252Ibid., p. 29. 
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253 problems in thousands of situations. The Swann decision actually 
addressed the question of busing very briefly. After a historical 
discussion and analysis that school buses had been a part of public 
education for years, the Court developed the thesis that because bus 
transportation was an accepted tool in education the District Court 
254 could indeed use buses to effectively dismantle the dual system. 
Therefore, busing was an acceptable remedy because "desegregation 
255 plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school. 
The final point addressed in Swann dealt with an answer to 
what was later to prove to be a problem concerning "white flight." 
Mr. Burger addressed future adjustments of busing plans by saying: 
It does not follow that the communities served by such 
systems will remain demographically stable . . . Neither 
school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally 
required to make year-to-year adjustments of the racial 
composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to 
desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination 
through official action is eliminated from the system.256 
This line of reasoning later became more fully developed in 
]a_2^ and W£ 
and mid-eighties. 
257 Pasaden  was important in several cases in the mid-seventies 
253Ibid. 
254Ibid., p. 30. 
255Ibid. 
256Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
2^Pasadena v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
89 
Swann was truly a landmark case in the efforts of the Supreme 
Court to desegregate the public schools. The decision's full impact 
was not realized until years later. This case made clear the Court's 
rationale that: (1) racial balance was indeed a consideration; 
(2) cross-district busing was a requirement when necessary to achieve 
a desegregated school system; and (3) school systems were not required 
to have student bodies and faculties with the same racial proportion 
as the community as a whole. Swann also introduced the philosophy 
of "intent" v. "extent." This philosophy states that the degree of 
"intent" to segregate determines the "extent" of the remedy of a 
court.258 
A companion case to Swann appeared to demonstrate even more 
clearly that busing could be required to achieve racial balance. 
259 Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County concerned 
a challenge to a school desegregation plan for Mobile County, Alabama 
as well as the city of Mobile and its suburbs. An area of 1,248 
square miles coverage was included. In 1969 the school system con­
tained some 73,500 students enrolled in ninety-one schools. Approxi­
mately fifty-eight percent of the students were white and forty-two 
percent were black. 
O CO 
Stockard, The United States Supreme Court and the Legal 
Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation, p. 93. 
259 Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 
402 U.S. 33 (1971). 
260ibid. 
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The metropolitan area of Mobile, Alabana, is divided by a major 
north-south highway. About ninety-four percent of the black students 
in the metropolitan area live east of the highway. The schools in 
the western section were relatively easy to desegregate. However, the 
plan formulated by the Department of Justice and approved by the Court 
of Appeals resulted in nine nearly all-black schools in the eastern 
section. The eastern section served sixty-four percent of all of the 
black elementary school students in the metropolitan area. In addi­
tion, over half of the black junior and senior high school students in 
metropolitan Mobile were attending all or nearly all-black schools. 
The plan which resulted in this number of black schools dealt with the 
eastern and western sections separately and did not provide for the 
movement of students across the highway as a means for effective 
desegregation. The adequacy of the plan was challenged. 
OC.O 
On appeal by the plaintiffs, the plan was rejected. The 
Court held that plans to create constitutionally mandated unitary 
school systems are not limited by the neighborhood school concept. 
The transition from a segregated to a unitary school system should 
include every effort to achieve actual desegregation. Bus transporta­
tion and split zoning must be given adequate consideration by the 
Pfil 
Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 91. 
oco 
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 
p. 35. 
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courts in developing effective desegregation plans and these methods 
o o 
must be used when other measures were ineffective. 
In delivering the Court's opinion, Chief Justice Warren Burger 
insisted that the Court of Appeals had erred when it allowed the 
isolation of the eastern section and had not considered all available 
techniques to produce optimum desegregation: 
On the record before us, it is clear that the Court of 
Appeals felt constrained to treat the eastern part of 
metropolitan Mobile in isolation from the rest of the 
school system, and that inadequate consideration was 
given to the possible use of bus transportation and split 
zoning.264 
Another companion case to Swann reiterated the Supreme Court's 
desire to see de jure segregated schools desegregated. The case of 
265 McDaniel v. Barresi came to the Court from the state of Georgia. 
The Clarke County, Georgia, school system had a white-black ratio 
of pupils in the elementary schools of approximately two-to-one. The 
Board of Education of Clarke County devised a student assignment plan 
for desegregating the elementary schools. The plan relied primarily 
upon geographic attendance zones drawn to achieve greater racial 
balance. Additionally, the pupils in five heavily black attendance 
263 Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 91. 
264 Dvis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 
p. 38. 
265McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971). 
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zones either walked or were transported by bus to schools located in 
other attendance zones.^ 
The board's plan resulted in elementary schools with black 
enrollment ranging from twenty percent to forty percent in all but 
two schools. In those two schools the black enrollment was fifty per­
cent. Parents of white students sued to enjoin the plan's operation, 
alleging that it violated the equal protection clause "by treating 
students differently because of their race and that transporting 
pupils in order to achieve racial balance is prohibited by Title IV 
of the Civil Rights Act."^ 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that a school 
board that operates a dual school system is charged with the affirma­
tive duty to take whatever steps are necessary to convert to a uni­
tary system. Transporting students based on race is an acceptable 
method that may be used to achieve this. The Court based its 
decision on the belief that transition from a dual to a unitary 
system will almost invariably require that students be assigned 
differently on the basis of race. The equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires this rather than prohibits it. This 
type plan is not barred by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act since the 
266 Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 92. 
2fi7 
McDaniel v. Barresi, p. 41 
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Act is directed only at federal officials and does not restrict state 
OCQ 
officials in assigning students within their school systems. 
Swann and its companion cases were followed by another North 
Carolina case, Winston-Sal em/Forsyth County Board of Education v. 
269 Catherine Scott. This case centered around appeals resulting from 
an order of the United States District Court which approved a modified 
plan for desegregation for certain North Carolina schools. This suit 
was pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit when the Supreme Court reached its decision in Swann. The 
Court of Appeals recommended the "instant proceedings with instruc­
tions to the District Court to receive new school board plans to 
270 meet the requirements of the Swann decision." The District Court 
interpreted the remand order to require a plan which would "achieve 
271 the greatest possible degree of desegregation." A revised plan 
was presented by the school board which would achieve a "fixed racial 
balance in the schools through a substantial increase in pupil bus-
272 ing. The new plan was then approved by the District Court. 
Following this approval the school board applied to Fourth Circuit 
268 Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 92. 
269 Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education v. 
Catherine Scott, 404 U.S. 1221 (1971). 
270Ibid., p. 1224. 
271 Ibid-, p. 1225. 
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Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger for a stay of the District Court's 
mandate. This stay was requested to allow the school board to 
273 "petition for certiorari to renew the Court of Appeals' decision." 
Justice Burger denied the request for stay by reasoning that 
"The stay application was not presented until seven and three days, 
274 respectively, before the school term" There was not enough time 
for the Court to deal adequately with the stay. The effect of this 
ruling was that the busing plan approved by the District Court was to 
be implemented. 
Following the Swann decision in 1971 the District Courts 
responded with many court ordered desegregation plans. The tool of 
desegregation in many of these decisions was busing. Efforts were 
made by local school boards as well as by state legislatures to 
circumvent these plans. In some situations local boards of education 
presented desegregation plans with busing as an integral part. These 
plans were often challenged by white parents. 
275 In Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia the Court 
addressed one effort to prevent a desegregation plan from being imple­
mented that involved "pairing" of schools as well as the use of bus4 
ing, Until the 1969-70 school year, the public schools in Greenville 
County, Virginia, were run on a segregated basis. All of the white 
273Ibid., p. 1231. 
274Ibid. 
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). 
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students in the county had been attending schools located in the town 
of Emporia. Black students had been attending schools located largely 
outside of Emporia. There was one school for blacks in Emporia. In 
1967, Emporia changed its status from a "town" to a "city" that 
could, under state law, maintain a separate school system. However, 
until a court-ordered adoption of a plan by which all children 
enrolled in a particular grade level would attend the same school, 
Emporia chose to remain part of the county school system. 
The Greenville County school board had originally adopted a 
"freedom-of"choice" plan that had been approved by the District Court. 
Following the Green decision of 1968, a suit was brought to force the 
plan to be changed in order to comply with the Court's decision in 
Green. A "pairing" plan involving busing was initiated by the 
District Court effective at the beginning of the 1969-70 school 
277 year. Two weeks later the City of Emporia announced that the city 
would operate its own school system. Suit was brought to enjoin the 
city from withdrawing Emporia children from the county public schools. 
The District Court insisted that such action would create a 
"substantial increase in the proportion of whites in the schools 
attended by city residents, and a concomitant decrease in the county 
278 schools." The increase would cause the county system to be 
276 
Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 94. 
277 Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, p. 451. 
^^Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 442 F. 2d 590. 
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twenty-eight percent white and seventy-two percent black, while the 
city schools would be forty-eight percent white and fifty-two percent 
black.279 
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court to 
consider whether a federal court might enjoin state or local officials 
from dividing and creating a new school district from a segregated 
school district. The Court held that the segregation had been county-
wide. The withdrawal of Emporia, the site of the better equipped, 
traditionally white schools, from the county school system would 
impede the dismantling of the unconstitutional, segregated school 
280 system and was therefore not to be permitted. 
In a similar case, United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of 
281 
Education, decided on the same day as Wright, the use of state 
legislative action to impede desegregation was addressed by the Court. 
This case came to the Court from North Carolina. 
The schools of Halifax County, North Carolina, were completely 
segregated by race until 1965. In that year, the school board 
adopted a "freedom-of-choice" plan that resulted in little desegrega-
tion. In 1968, the Department of Justice and the school board agreed 
to a plan to create a unitary system for Halifax County beginning with 
the 1969-70 school year. In 1969, a bill was passed by the state 
?7Q 
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 464 (1972) 
280Ibid., p. 464. 
281 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, 407 
U.S. 484 (1972). 
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legislature enabling the city of Scotland Neck to create, by majority 
vote, its own separate school district. Scotland Neck was part of 
the county school system until this time. The newly created district 
would be fifty-seven percent white and forty-three percent black. 
The schools in the rest of Halifax County would be about ninety 
percent black. The United States Department of Justice instituted 
litigation enjoining the implementation of the statute on grounds 
that it "created a refuge for white students and promoted school 
282 segregation in the county." 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The ques­
tion before the Court was to decide whether the dismantling of a 
dual school system was furthered or hindered by creating a new school 
district from the larger school district. 
The Court ruled that the dismantling of a segregated school 
system cannot be impeded by the legislative creation of two new 
283 districts, one white and one black. The Fourteenth Amendment, as 
interpreted in the Brown decisions, forbids state action creating, 
supporting, or perpetuating segregated schools. That state action 
involved in this case was by legislative action rather than by school 
board action does not change its segregative effect or make it 
i. . 284 valid. 
282ibid. 
283Ib1d., p. 489. 
284Ibid. 
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In the case of Drummond v. Acree the Court considered a 
challenge to a desegregation plan from white parents in Augusta, 
Georgia. The District Court had ordered the busing of students to 
accomplish desegregation of the elementary school system in Augusta. 
Parents sought a stay of the order premised on the federal statute, 
Title VIII, section 803, which reads: 
In the case of any order on the part of any United States 
district court which requires the transfer or transporta­
tion of any student . . . for the purposes of achieving a 
balance among students with respect to race . . . the 
effectiveness of such order shall be postponed until all 
appeals . . . have been exhausted. 
The Court ruled that Title VIII, section 803, does not act to 
block orders requiring the transportation of students for the purpose 
of desegregating a school system. It postpones implementation only 
of those orders requiring the transportation of any student for the 
purpose of achieving a balance among the students with respect to 
no C 
race. The Swann finding, that the constitutional command to 
desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community 
must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a 
whole, was verified in this decision. 
The issue of consolidation of school districts to achieve 
racial balance came to the Court in School Board of Richmond, 
Virginia v. State Board of Education of Virginia in 1973. The 
Richmond school system had been involved in a series of segregation 
285Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228 (1972). 
Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 96. 
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cases and litigation. The student enrollment had increased from 
287 forty-three percent black to over seventy percent black in 1969. 
In 1971, the District Court ordered a racial-balance plan 
intended to eradicate "racial indentifiability of each facility to 
288 the extent feasible within the city of Richmond." Richmond moved 
to have the city's school system consolidated with two nearby county 
school systems that were ninety-one percent white. The District 
289 Court ordered the consolidation. 
The order was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit by the two county school boards. The District Court's judg-
290 ment was reversed. The issue centered around whether a school 
system might be consolidated to create a system with a lower ratio 
of black students. Having relied on Swarm, the court found that 
there was no constitutional requirement for racial balance other than 
291 in the process of dismantling the dual system. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The 
Court's decision was split 4-4 thus sustaining the Fourth Circuit's 
287 
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, 412 
F. 2d 1058, 1074 (1972). 
288 
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, 325 
F. Supp. 835 (1971). 
289 
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, 338 
F. Supp. 67 (1972). 
290 
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, 462 
F. 2d 1058 (1972). 
291 Ibid., p. 1060. 
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292 decision. Justice Powell did not participate in the Court's 
decision because he had served on the Richmond school board for 
twenty-five years. To have participated in the Court's decision would 
have been a conflict of interest for him. 
In 1982 the Supreme Court found itself considering an extra­
ordinary question in the Washington v. Seattle School District 
293 No. 1 case. The question before the Court was whether an elected 
school board could use the Fourteenth Amendment to defend its program 
of busing for integration from attack by the State. Seattle School 
District No. 1 was largely coterminous with the city of Seattle, 
Washington, and was charged by state law with administering 112 
schools and educating approximately 54,000 public school students. 
Approximately thirty-seven percent of those students were of Black, 
Asian, American Indian, or Hispanic ancestry. Because segregated 
housing patterns in Seattle had created racially imbalanced schools, 
the school system had historically taken steps to alleviate the 
294 isolation of minority students. 
In 1977 the school system came under increasing pressure to 
accelerate its program of desegregation. The school board responded 
by enacting a resolution defining "racial imbalance" as "the situa­
tion that exists when the combined minority student enrollment in a 
292 Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, 412 
U.S. 92 (1972). 
293 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 
(1982). 
294 
Ibid., p. 460. 
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school exceeds the district-wide combined average by 20 percentage 
.  . .  • 
points." No school was to have a minority enrollment of more than 
295 fifty percent. In 1978 the school system enacted the so-called 
Seattle Plan for desegregation of its schools. The plan made 
extensive use of mandatory busing. 
Subsequently, a state-wide initiative (Initiative 350) was 
drafted to terminate the use of mandatory busing for purposes of 
racial integration in the public schools of the State of Washington. 
The initiative prohibited school boards from requiring any student to 
attend a school other than the one geographically nearest or next 
nearest to his home. There were some exceptions to this prohibition, 
but these exceptions permitted school boards to assign students away 
from their neighborhood schools only for nonintegrative purposes. The 
initiative was passed at the November 1978 general election. The 
Seattle School District, along with two other districts, brought 
suit challenging the constitutionality of Initiative 350 under the 
296 Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The District Court held the initiative unconstitutional because 
it established an impermissible racial classification. The initiative 
permitted busing for nonracial reasons but forbade it for racial 
reasons. The court permanently enjoined implementation of the initia­
tive's restrictions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's ruling. The United States Supreme Court 
296Ibid., p. 464. 
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upheld the position of the Court of Appeals and declared that Initia­
tive 350 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
297 Amendment. Justice Blackmun, in delivering the opinion of the 
Court, stated: 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not undervalue the magni­
tude of the State's interest in its system of education. 
Washington could have reserved to state officials the right 
to make all decisions in the areas of education and student 
assignment. It has chosen, however, to use a more elaborate 
system; having done so, the State is obligated to operate 
that system within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
That, we believe, it has failed to do.298 
3.4 Implications for De Facto Segregation 
After 1971, the Swann decision mandated nationwide racial 
quotas by busing, if necessary, requiring all school systems to 
eliminate de jure segregation. The legal battle then transferred to 
non-Southern school districts where the issue was de facto segrega­
tion. Because of the absence of state-imposed segregation laws, 
proof of discrimination was very difficult to assess in such situa-
299 tions. 
De facto segregation and busing became almost inseparable 
issues. The decade of the seventies produced numerous cases concern­
ing school desegregation. Unlike prior de jure cases in which the 
Supreme Court always decided with near unanimity, de facto cases 
297Ibid., p. 487. 
298Ibid. 
299 James N. Fuller, The Legal Aspects of Busing for Desegrega­
tion in De Facto School Districts CEd.D. Dissertation, University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro, 1983), p. 79. 
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brought diverse opinions. Litigations received thorough examinations 
and individual justices often gave differing constitutional 
300 reviews. 
During the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court had given 
Northern and Western cities a reprieve. Urban school districts with 
neighborhood schools had been left undisturbed by the judiciary. 
Courts had simply been too preoccupied with school systems in the 
rural South. When Swann switched the spotlight from rural to urban 
school systems the North and West became exposed to possible 
301 action. "You cannot conclude," wrote the Los Angeles Times, "that 
Los Angeles and other Californian and Northern cities are wholly 
302 unaffected by the Court's claim of reasoning in Swann." The effect 
would soon be felt. On October 12, 1972, sixteen months after Swann, 
303 the Supreme Court heard its first "Northern and Western" case. 
The case was Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, 
304 Colorado. This case was different from Southern de jure cases 
because there had never been required segregation in Denver, Colorado. 
Keyes was a de facto case. The significance of the Keyes decision 
was that the United States Supreme Court extended the definition of 
301 Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke, p. 195. 
302 
Editorial, Los Angeles Times, April 22, 1971. 
303 Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke, p. 195. 
304 Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, Colorado, 413 
U.S. 189 (1973). 
104 
de jure segregation to include school systems intentionally segregat­
ing even if not by state statute. 
Litigation in Keyes originated from petitioners seeking to 
desegregate the Park Hill area schools in Denver. The District Court 
ordered desegregation of these schools, and the suit was extended in 
305 an attempt to secure desegregation of the remaining Denver schools. 
The District Court denied the additional relief sought by proclaiming 
that the deliberate racial segregation of the Park Hill schools was 
not proof enough that a similar segregation policy addressed specifi­
cally to the core city schools existed and demanded that the peti­
tioners prove de jure segregation existed for each area that they 
one 
sought to desegregate. 
The District Court found that "white" schools in other parts of 
the school district were superior to segregated core city schools and 
relied on Plessy to order the school system to provide substantially 
equal facilities for the core city schools. This relief was reversed 
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals even though that court affirmed 
that, although the Park Hill schools were deliberately segregated, 
there was no overall school board activity that established a policy 
307 of system-wide segregation. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court modified and 
remanded the case. Justice William Brennan delivered the opinion of 
306Ibid., p. 196. 
307Ibid., p. 197. 
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the Court in which he conceded this case did not meet the "segregation 
by statute" rule as was decided upon in Brown I, Brown II. and Swarm. 
He then added: 
Nevertheless, where plaintiffs prove that the school 
authorities have carried out a systematic program of 
segregation, ... it is only common sense to conclude 
that there exists a predicate for a finding of the 
existence of a dual school system.308 
Thus the Supreme Court for the first time in Keyes all but 
ordered busing for a city outside the South. It relieved black 
plaintiffs of the task of proving school board discrimination in each 
and every school in a Northern or Western school system before city-
wide busing could be imposed. And the Court served notice that when 
two reasonable alternative courses existed, the school board had best 
309 choose the one which resulted in greater integration. 
In 1974, the twentieth anniversary of Brown I, the Supreme 
Court of the United States ruled on a case of extreme importance. 
310 The case was Mi Hi ken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley. The ques­
tion in Mi Hi ken was one of remedy; whether courts could use suburban 
pupils to desegregate inner city schools. Federal District Judge 
Stephen Roth had found that the Detroit Board of Education was guilty 
of the usual ploys to obstruct integration. Those usual ploys 
included optional attendance zones, gerrymandered school boundaries, 
308Ibid., p. 213. 
309 Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke, p. 198. 
^Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 718 
(1974). 
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and segregative transportation and school construction policies. The 
state of Michigan was also found to have delayed Detroit's desegrega-
311 tion by its funding policies and use of special legislation. Judge 
Roth joined fifty-three of Detroit's eighty-five outlying suburban 
school districts with the city school district in the desegregation 
312 decree and ordered a nine member panel to draft a detailed plan. 
The scope of Judge Roth's order was staggering. The new 
metropolitan school district would contain 780,000 pupils, of whom 
some 310,000 would be daily transported in the interest of desegrega­
tion. Busing was to be "a two-way process with both black and white 
pupils sharing the responsibility for transportation requirements at 
313 all grade levels." Even kindergarten was to be included. The 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, by a vote of six to three, 
Judge Roth's findings and the need for a metropolitan desegregation 
plan.314 
On certiorari, July 25, 1974, the Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the case for the development of a plan restricted to the city 
315 
of Detroit. By a vote of five to four, the Court "saved" the 
suburbs. Justice Powell, who had abstained in the Bradley decision, 
voted with the majority. The Court ruled that Judge Roth had wrongly 
^Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
312Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
313Ibid., p. 919. 
314Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F. 2d 215 (CA6 1973). 
315Mi11iken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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included the outlying suburban school districts with Detroit in the 
one 
desegregation decree. The holding was that absent a showing that 
the outlying districts had failed to operate unitary school systems 
or had committed acts that fostered segregation in other school 
districts, a court-ordered school desegregation plan could not cross 
317 school district lines to include the districts in the plan. 
31Q 
A 1975 decision by the Supreme Court in Tasby v. Estes let 
stand an order by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which mandated 
busing in Dallas, Texas. The actual busing began in the fall of 1976 
when approximately seventeen thousand students, in grades four through 
319 eight, were bused. Some ten thousand students were bused volun­
tarily in order to take advantage of special educational programs 
that were offered in schools outside their neighborhoods. The plan 
incorporated seven Dallas suburbs because of a charge that the 
district operated a racially segregated system of blacks and Mexican-
320 Americans. This case differed from the Detroit case in that there 
was: (1) no unitary system established in Dallas; and (2) there was 
prima facie evidence of a segregated system. 
"^Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke, p. 222. 
317 
Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, p. 102. 
318Tasby v. Estes, 423 U.S. 93 (1975). 
319 
"Another Year of Turmoil in Schools?" U.S. News and World 
Report, September 31 , 1976, p. 31. 
320 
"Testing Time for Busing," Newsweek, September 8, 1975, 
p. 79. 
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Some lower courts still sought to implement metropolitan 
desegregation after Mi 11iken. That case, they believed, reflected the 
unmanageability of large metropolitan areas such as Detroit. In 
middle-sized areas, such as Wilmington, Delaware, and Louisville, 
Kentucky, suburban busing appeared to be more feasible. The Supreme 
Court declined to upset lower court judgments in either the Buchanan 
321 v. Evans case, which required twelve school districts to merge in 
Wilmington, Delaware, or the Newburg Area Council v. Jefferson County 
322 Board of Education case, which required the merger of three school 
districts in Louisville, Kentucky. In both these cases de jure 
segregation was proven to have been established by legislative statute. 
On January 28, 1976, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down another landmark decision in Pasadena City Board of Education v. 
323 Spangler. There the plan approved by the District Court required 
that "there shall be no school in the Pasadena District, elementary 
or junior high or senior high, with a majority of any minority 
324 students." The District Court had also interpreted this provision 
to require adjustments in the racial composition of schools on an 
325 annual basis. 
^Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). 
322 Newburg Area Council v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 
421 U.S. 931 (1974). 
323Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 427 
(1976). 
324Ibid., p. 428. 
325Ibid., p. 433. 
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The Supreme Court emphatically rejected that view. Once 
desegregation was accomplished, and student assignments placed on a 
racially neutral basis, yearly readjustments were not required. The 
Court held that resegregation might even take place, if it did so 
through "random" population movement and not by official blessing or 
design. The lack of segregative intent on behalf of the school 
board proved more important in this case than the actual segregated 
housing pattern which resulted in the racial ratios in the schools. 
By the time of this case, segregation by intent, by school boards or 
state agencies, had become the primary issue in Supreme Court 
decisions. 
327 
In Austin Independent School District v. United States the 
issue of student assignments was questioned. Most of Austin was 
residentially segregated. The school board's policy was to assign 
students to schools nearest their homes. This resulted in forty-five 
percent of the Mexican-American students attending schools that had 
enrollments that were sixty percent black or Mexican-American. The 
complaint was that this policy constituted de jure segregation. In 
writing the majority decision of the Court, Judge Powell stated: 
The principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in urban 
public schools across the country—North and South—is the 
imbalance in residential patterns. Irish residential 
patterns are typically beyond the control of school 
326Ibid., pp. 435-436. 
Austin Independent School District v. United States, 429 
U.S. 991 (1976). 
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authorities. For example, discrimination in housing, 
whether public or private, cannot be attributed to school 
authorities . . .328 
Justice Powell did not, however, discount the use of busing 
to desegregate. He did outline the use of busing under certain 
circumstances: 
Large scale busing is permissible only where the evidence 
supports a finding that the extent of integration sought 
to be achieved by busing would have existed had the school 
authorities fulfilled their constitutional obligations in 
the past.329 
Once again the Court proclaimed that the order for busing would 
be predicated on a history of de jure segregation as in Swann and 
Keyes. Without that burden of proof, the Court said there would be 
no widespread busing as a remedy. 
In the 1978 Bustop v. The Borad of Education of the City of 
330 Los Angeles case, Justice Rehnquist, as Circuit Justice, addressed 
the question of whether a state could impose more atringent require­
ments for desegregation on school systems than were required by the 
United States Constitution. The case came from California where the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County had prescribed a desegregation 
plan for the schools of Los Angeles County. The plan required the 
reassignment of over 60,000 students in the school district; and the 
busing of some of these students involved a one and one-half hour 
328Ibid., p. 996. 
329Ibid., p. 998. 
330 Bustop v. The Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles, 
439 U.S. 1380 (1978). 
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ride to school. The Court of Appeals of California had ordered a 
stay of the plan, but the Supreme Court of California had vacated 
this stay.33^ 
An organization representing students who would be bused under 
the plan applied to Circuit Justice Rhenquist for a stay of the 
California Supreme Court's order, pending the filing of a petition 
for certiorari or an appeal. The plaintiffs argued that the decision 
of the Supreme Court of California was at odds with recent United 
States Supreme Court rulings on school desegregation. The plaintiffs 
argued that the state court had gone further than what was required 
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Justice Rhenquist denied the application for stay on the basis 
of four premises: (1) The state's highest court premised its decision 
not on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
on the state constitution, which it had construed to require less of 
a showing on the part of the plaintiffs who seek court-ordered busing 
than the United States Supreme Court had required of Plaintiffs who 
332 sought similar relief under the Federal Constitution. (2) It was 
not probable that four Justices of the Supreme Court would vote to 
333 grant certiorari. (3) Even if the applicant was viewed as having 
a stronger federal claim on the merits, the fact that the schools 
were scheduled to open in four days was an equitable consideration 
332Ibid., p. 1381. 
333Ibid., p. .1382. 
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counseling against once more upsetting the expectations of the parties 
in the case. (4) The school board raised no objection to the plan 
and the state's highest court had apparently placed its approval on 
it, the complaints of the parents and children being complaints about 
state law, and it being in the forums of the state that such questions 
334 must be resolved. Thus, the Supreme Court refused to become 
involved in state actions requiring more extensive actions for school 
desegregation. 
335 
In the 1979 Columbus Board of Education v. Pennick case, the 
Supreme Court upheld a district-wide busing plan. The Court insisted 
that because the school system had been segregated at the time of 
Brown I, the school board had an affirmative constitutional responsi­
bility to end that segregation. The Columbus, Ohio, public schools 
of 96,000 students were highly segregated with seventy percent of all 
students attending schools that were at least eighty percent black 
or eighty percent white. In addition, half of the 172 schools were 
ninety percent black or ninety percent white. The Court held that 
local board actions such as teacher assignment, attendance zoning, 
and school site selection could constitute sufficient proof of 
discriminatory intent and impact to establish an equal protection 
violation and to warrant a district-wide busing plan. It was held 
334Ibid., p. 1383. 
335Columbus Board of Education v. Pennick, 443 U.S. 461 (1979). 
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that the system had "never actively set out to dismantle this dual 
system. "33® 
The decision of the Supreme Court in this case chipped away at 
the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. Court-
ordered busing was upheld in a school system where segregation was 
not state imposed or state sanctioned. 
The Dayton case began in 1972 when several students, through 
their parents, brought charges that the Dayton Board of Education and 
various officials as well as the Ohio State Board of Education were 
operating a segregated school system in violation of the Equal Protec-
337 tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this Dayton I case, 
the District Court found: (1) the existence of racially imbalanced 
schools; (2) the use of optional attendance zones; and (3) a recent 
Dayton Board of Education recission of resolutions passed by the 
previous Board, which resolutions had acknowledged a role played by 
the Board in creation of segregative racial patterns. Based on these 
findings the District Court ruled that there was cumulatively a 
violation of the equal protection clause in the operation of the 
338 Dayton schools. 
The United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals approved a 
District Court plan involving district-wide racial distribution of 
each school which was to be brought within fifteen percent of the 
336Ibid. 
33^Dayton Board of Education v. Brickman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
338Ibid. 
114 
339 black-white ratio of Dayton. On certiorari, the United States 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded, because the Court held that 
constitutional violations found by the District Court did not justify 
340 the broad district-wide remedy imposed. This decision seemed to 
increase the burden of demonstrating nonsegregative intent by school 
341 officials and to limit the extent of remedies. The city's desegre­
gation plan was ordered left in place. 
In Dayton II, after the District Court had dismissed the com­
plaint, the Court of Appeals ruled that at the time of Brown I in 
1954, the Dayton Board of Education had operated a racially segregated 
dual school system. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the 
school board was constitutionally required to disestablish that 
system and its effects, but that it had failed to discharge this duty. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the consequences of the dual 
system, together with the intentionally segregative impact of various 
practices since 1S54, were system-wide and needed a system-wide 
342 remedy. 
On July 2, 1979, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals 
ruling in Dayton II as well as the Columbus ruling on the same day. 
These two Ohio cases strengthened the doctrine established in Keyes 
339Ibid. 
340Ibid. 
341 James B. Stedman, Busing for Segregation, Issue Brief 
Number IB 81010, (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, 1982), p. 78. 
342 
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
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that federal courts could order a remedy where public school segre­
gation was found to be the result of actions by school boards or 
other school governing units. 
3.5 A Possible Return to Neighborhood Schools 
Since 1979 the United States Supreme Court has left school 
desegregation cases involving busing to the lower courts. The Court 
apparently feels that it has established clear guidelines for busing 
for desegregation purposes. In the Court's effort to eliminate all 
vestiges of de jure segregation in the American school systems, it 
has often been necessary to bus students outside their neighborhoods 
to achieve better racial balance in the schools. 
But what happens once a school board complies with a court-
ordered desegregation plan and establishes a racially unitary system? 
Must the board continue to follow that plan? Or may it alter or 
even abandon the plan? And what should a board do if a court-ordered 
desegregation plan designed to improve racial balance actually makes 
343 
things worse by triggering white flight? These questions are 
currently being dealt with by school systems attempting to return to 
neighborhood schools. 
These questions have been answered differently by Courts of 
Appeals in the Fourth and Tenth Circuits. This led to confusion 
about how school boards might cope with resegregation. In November, 
1986, the United States Supreme Court declined to resolve the split 
343 
Sendor, "These Two Cases Raise Key Questions," p. 12. 
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between these two federal appeals courts over the constitutionality 
of school districts1 plans to abandon court-ordered busing and return 
344 to neighborhood schools. 
The move by the Court surprised many legal observers. The 
Court voted eight to one to let stand conflicting appellate-court 
rulings in desegregation cases involving the Norfolk, Virginia, and 
345 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, public schools. 
In the Norfolk case, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, in February, 1986, upheld a new student assign­
ment policy that resulted in black enrollments of more than ninety 
percent in ten of the district's thirty-six elementary schools. In 
contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
in June, 1986, invalidated a similar neighborhood schools' plan that 
had left thirty-three of the Oklahoma districts' sixty-four schools 
346 more than ninety percent black. 
The appeals courts thus reached opposite conclusions on one of 
the last major unsettled issues of school desegregation law: Must 
formerly segregated districts continue to bus students indefinitely, 
even though they have complied fully with court orders and are now 
347 considered unitary? 
344 
Tom Mirga, "Justices Decline to Review Cases on Desegrega­
tion," Education Week, November 12, 1986, p. 1. 
345Ibid. 
346Ibid. 
347Ibid., p. 9. 
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The Norfolk case, Riddick v. School Board of City of 
349 Norfolk, addressed a plan by the Norfolk school board to return to 
neighborhood schools at the elementary school level. The Norfolk 
school system originally operated as a dual system. In 1972, the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed a District Court order that called for 
cross-town busing as a remedy for de jure segregation and a means of 
arriving at a unitary system. The school board complied. In 1975, 
after declaring the Norfolk public schools a racially unitary system, 
350 the District Court dismissed the desegregation suit. 
Over the next few years, white flight began to erode the 
accomplishments of the court-ordered plan. Between 1970 and 1980, 
Norfolk's population changed from a racial mix of seventy percent 
white and twenty-eight percent black to a mix of sixty percent white 
and thirty-five percent black. The change was more dramatic in the 
public schools. The result was an outright reversal of the school 
systen's racial composition, from fifty-seven percent white and 
forty-three percent black in 1970 to forty-three percent white and 
•am 
fifty-seven percent black in 1980. 
The racial change was accompanied by a drop in total enroll­
ment. The school board closed seventeen elementary schools. Most of 
1986). 
350 
348Ibid. 
349Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk, 784 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 
Sendor, "These Two Cases Raise Key Questions," p. 12. 
351 Ibid. 
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these seventeen were in predominantly black neighborhoods. In 1977, 
only one elementary school was more than seventy percent black. Due 
to the loss of white students the number of elementary schools that 
had more than seventy percent black enrollment increased to seven by 
1981. And during the same years, parent involvement in many of the 
schools dropped sharply, with PTA membe-ship declining from between 
15,000 and 20,000 to only 3,500.352 
To remedy these problems, the school board in 1983 adopted a 
voluntary desegregation plan that eliminated all cross-town busing 
of elementary school students. All Norfolk elementary schools 
became neighborhood schools, with attendance zones gerrymandered to 
produce the maximum integration possible without busing. The plan 
also permitted any students attending schools in which their race 
constituted at least seventy percent of the student body to transfer 
to schools in which their race constituted less than fifty percent. 
Finally, the plan called for programs to boost parent involvement and 
to expose elementary school students to students of other races. 
This plan resulted in twelve of the city's thirty-six elementary 
schools becoming more than seventy percent black, ten of those twelve 
would be more than ninety-five percent black, and six other elementary 
353 schools would become more than seventy percent white. 
The plan was approved by the District Court. On appeal, the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. 
^Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk, p. 524. 
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The Court of Appeals reasoning for its decision was based on 
the District Court's 1975 declaration that Norfolk had achieved a 
unitary system. This declaration freed the school board from any 
duty to continue court-ordered busing for desegregation. Once de jure 
segregation was declared ended, the board had a clean slate and was 
free to change its pupil assignment system as long as the changes 
354 made were not undertaken with discriminatory intent. The court 
also felt that the school board's desire to stop white flight and 
boost parent participation was a legitimate reason for shifting to a 
neighborhood elementary school system. 
The Court of Appeals stated: 
While the effect of the plan in creating several black 
schools is disquieting, that fact alone is not sufficient 
to prove discriminatory intent, . . . We do not think this 
is a case in which a school board, upon obtaining a 
judicial decision that it is unitary, turns its back on 
the rights of its minority students and reverts to its old 
discriminatory ways. If such were the case, we would, of 
course, not approve Norfolk's new assignment pi an.355 
The group of black parents and students who opposed the school 
board's plan sought Supreme Court review of the Riddick case, but the 
High Court declined to hear it. That decision left the Fourth 
Circuit's ruling intact without approving it. 
Reactions to the Riddick decision have ranged from approval to 
alarm. The United States Department of Justice, which had supported 
the board's plan to end the busing, called the result "a much needed 
"^Sendor, "These Two Cases Raise Key Questions," p. 12. 
^Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk, p. 572. 
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breath of fresh air in our continuing effort to achieve meaningful 
desegregation that is more fully sensitive to the educational needs 
of public school students not only in Norfolk, but throughout the 
356 
country." But to Napoleon B. Williams, Jr., an attorney for the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which represented the Norfolk plaintiffs, 
the Riddick decision is likely to reverse more than thirty years of 
progress in school desegregation. He is concerned that the decision 
will be "an open invitation" to districts across the country to obtain 
a declaration of unitariness, let it stand for a few years, and then 
357 go back to racially identifiable neighborhood schools. James 
Nabrit, III, director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
states that the decision could "permit a very general resegregation 
of the public schools of the South."3*'8 
As stated earlier, the Riddick decision applies only to states 
in the Fourth Circuit, but it may well be considered as a precedent 
by courts across the country and used by those who believe that 
federal courts should now step aside in school districts that have 
359 converted from dual to unitary systems. The United States Depart­
ment of Justice Civil Rights Division announced that the legal princi­
ples in the case could apply to "many, many other school districts 
3^6School Law News, February 20, 1986, p. 1. 
^Education Meek, February 19, 1986, p. 18. 
358Education USA, June 9, 1986, p. 316. 
3^Mesibov, "Busing in Unitary School Districts," p. 19. 
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OCQ 
across the country." In school desegregation suits involving the 
Justice Department, one hundred seventeen school districts are now 
declared unitary, and forty-seven have had desegregation orders dis­
missed by the courts. These districts can use the Riddick decision if 
361 
they choose to eliminate busing. Most of them are in rural 
Alabama and Georgia. Desegregation experts say there are no accurate 
statistics on the total number of districts that have been declared 
362 
unitary and which may be able to consider ending busing plans. 
In Powell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public 
363 
Schools, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals faced a similar situa­
tion to that addressed in Riddick. Federal court supervision of the 
Oklahoma City schools began in 1961. In 1972 a federal district court 
ordered the school board to adopt a systemwide desegregation plan 
that included busing. This plan, known as the "Finger Plan," 
restructured attendance zones for high schools and middle schools so 
that each school had both black and white students. Elementary 
schools that had a majority black enrollment were converted to fifth-
grade centers. Elementary schools with a majority white enrollment 
were converted to serve grades one through four. The general result 
of this plan was that most white students in grades one through four 
^60News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 17, 1986, p. 1A. 
^Education Meek, February 26, 1986, p. 9. 
^Education Meek, November 12, 1986, p. 9. 
q/ro 
Dowel! v. Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Public 
Schools, 795 F. 2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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continued to attend neighborhood schools, while black students in 
these grades were bused. Most black fifth graders attended the fifth 
grade centers in their neighborhoods with white fifth graders being 
bused. Students in grades one through five who already attended 
schools in integrated areas were allowed to stay in their neighbor­
hoods.3®^ 
In 1977, the Western District Court in Oklahoma ruled the 
Oklahoma City schools a racially unitary school system and terminated 
active supervision of the case. However, the Court's order did not 
vacate or modify the 1972 order mandating busing of students for 
desegregation purposes. The 1972 order also required court approval 
before any changes could be made in the operation of the school system 
under this plan. The court did not foresee that the plan would be 
dismantled when its jurisdiction ended or that the board would 
365 intentionally take any action to undermine the unitary system. 
Several years later, Oklahoma City began to experience a drop 
in enrollment of white students, a large decrease in parent involve-
Off 
ment, and changing housing patterns. Without seeking approval of 
the court, the school board decided to abandon the court-ordered 
desegregation plan and adopt a new one that reinstituted neighbor­
hood elementary schools for grades one through four. If students were 
assigned to a school where their race was in the majority, they would 
364 
Mesibov, "Busing in Unitary School Districts," p. 25. 
365Ibid. 
366 
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be allowed to transfer to a school where their race was in the 
minority. The new plan also contained other methods to insure the 
equality of schools and means of bringing white and black students 
together several times a year. As a result of the new plan, thirty-
three of the system's sixty-four elementary schools became at least 
ninety percent black or ninety percent white. 
A group of black parents and students asked the District Court 
to reopen the case it had closed in 1977. The District Court found 
the new plan to be constitutional and refused to reopen the original 
case. The group appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which reversed the lower court's ruling. 
The Tenth Circuit judges disagreed with their colleagues from 
the Fourth Circuit. They ruled that being declared a unitary school 
system did not end the school board's duty to adhere to the court-
ordered desegregation plan. The court ruled that it would be neces­
sary for the school board to prove that the original need for the 
desegregation plan had vanished and that new circumstances had made 
the court-ordered plan oppressive. 
In giving its opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals said: 
When it is asserted that a school baord under the duty imposed 
by a mandatory court order has adopted a new attendance plan 
that is significantly different from the plan approved by the 
court and when the results of the plan indicate a resurgence 
of segregation, the court is duty bound either to enforce 
367 
Dowel! v. Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Schools, 
606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985). 
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its order or inquire 'hether a change of circumstances 
. . . has occurred.368 
The Dowell decision leaves the door open for the Oklahoma City 
school board to go back to the District Court and to attempt to prove 
what the Fourth Circuit said in Riddick; that the court-ordered plan 
had indeed become oppressive because changed circumstances, such as 
white flight and decreased parent involvement in the schools, had 
themselves caused resegregation and diminished the quality of educa-
369 tion. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made it clear that its 
decision should not be interpreted as addressing the ultimate issue 
of the constitutionality of the attendance plan presented by the 
school board. 
The main differences in the decisions in Riddick and Dowel1 
are procedural in nature. The Fourth Circuit put the burden on the 
plaintiffs to prove the Norfolk school board intended to discriminate 
when it changed its pupil assignment plan. The Tenth Circuit, on the 
other hand, put the burden on the school board to prove the propriety 
of its new plan. It is also important to note that the Oklahoma City 
School Board attempted to implement its new plan without requesting 
District Court approval. The Norfolk School Board sought District 
Court approval of its proposed plan before implementation. 
The Supreme Court's decision not to grant certiorari in these 
two cases took many observers by surprise. The Supreme Court Justices 
o/ro 
Dowell v. Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Schools, 
795 F. 2d, p. 1520. 
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usually act quickly to resolve differences in rulings handed down by 
370 
the federal circuit courts. It also left in doubt what the 
Court's true message was behind this action to deny certiorari. 
Several theories have been offered to try to explain the Court's 
action. 
One theory holds that a majority of the Justices concluded that 
it would be better at this time to leave the lower courts with broad 
discretion, even though inconsistent decisions might result from such 
action, than to set a single nationwide rule for ending desegregation 
cases. 
Another theory suggests that the Court could not reach a 
majority decision on this issue and, therefore, decided to let the 
issue wait. This theory suggests that the Court did not want to 
produce a ruling filled with several concurring and dissenting 
opinions. 
A third theory, and possibly the most plausible, contends that 
a five- or six-member bloc has emerged within the Court to uphold the 
Fourth Circuit's decision. This would explain the Court's vote not 
to hear the Norfolk case. This theory suggests that this majority 
denied review in the Oklahoma City Case because several procedural 
matters must be resolved when the suit is sent back to federal 
district court. If the Tenth Circuit ruling is still intact on a 
370 
Education Week, November 12, 1986, p. 9. 
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second appeal to the Court, the theory concluded, the Justices will 
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then vote to overturn it, establishing a clear national precedent. 
Whatever the real intention of the Supreme Court was, the 
decision not to hear Riddick and Powell has resulted in unfortunate 
confusion about how school boards may cope with resegregation. But 
the issue will not go away. Many urban school systems presently face 
the same type of conditions as do Norfolk and Oklahoma City. These 
school systems seem to have only two choices. They can stay with the 
court-ordered plans now in place and risk a school system that is free 
of de jure segregation but which has few white students; or they can 
adopt a new attendance plan that will help preserve the systemwide 
level of white enrollment but which results in the resegregation of 
372 some schools. 
3.6 Summary 
School authorities in every school district in the United 
States have an obligation to operate a school system that is free 
from racial discrimination. If, and only if, they fail in this 
obligation can judicial authority be invoked. If judicial action is 
necessary, the court's task is to take action that will result in 
correction of the condition that offends the Constitution. Such 
action has been necessary on numerous occasions when school systems 
have been found to be operating illegal segregated systems. 
371ibid. 
372ibid. 
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Segregation is unconstitutional if it is state-compelled or 
state-authorized and results from state action that was adopted with 
the specific intent of separating students on the basis of race and 
does so. Sometimes, the term segregation is also used to apply to 
situations in which separation of students occurs as an incidental 
and unintended consequence of some governmental or private action. 
Under this use of the term, segregation is not illegal. 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed two types of 
segregation. De jure segregation results as a matter of law and is 
unconstitutional. De facto segregation is not unconstitutional and 
results from an incidental and unintended basis. 
Brown I held that segregation of children in public schools 
solely on the basis of race was a violation of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown II authorized lower courts 
to take various actions to order school districts to remedy state 
imposed segregation. The use of busing to remedy illegal segregation 
of public school students became a reality with the Swann decision 
of 1971. Following Swann, busing became a common tool of the District 
Court as it sought to enforce the desegregation of de jure segregated 
school systems. 
De facto segregation was addressed by the Court in the Keyes 
decision of 1973 and the Mi Hi ken decision of 1974. The finding was 
that de facto segregation, in itself, is not unconstitutional. It 
becomes unconstitutional only if there is proof that there was 
purposeful discrimination in the action that caused the de facto 
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segregation. If such purposeful discrimination is proven then the 
court has the responsibility of requiring action by the school system 
that will undo the dual school system and will result in a unitary 
school system. Busing was often the tool used to accomplish this 
task. 
The Pasadena case of 1976 gave some relief to school systems 
under court-ordered busing plans when the Court stated that annual 
adjustments to the plan were not necessary. The 1986 refusal of the 
Supreme Court to stop the implementation of a return to neighborhood 
schools in Norfolk, Virginia, provides further hope for some school 
systems that the continuing use of busing may be reduced. Perhaps 
the Supreme Court will soon agree to hear one, or several, cases 
concerning the return to neighborhood schools by school systems that 
have been declared to now be unitary. Such action by the Court would 
set definitive standar-s for boards of education as they attempt to 
reverse white flight and the reduction of parental involvement in the 
public schools. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS 
4.0. Introduction. 
4.1. Legalized Busing. 
4.2. Alteration of School District. 
4.3. Intent to Segregate. 
4.4. Annual Readjustment of Attendance Zones. 
4.5. Extent of the Remedy. 
4.6. Once a School System is Unitary. 
4.0 Introduction 
The Brown decision(s) of 1954 and 1955 served as a basis for 
all other court decisions concerning the use of busing for school 
desegregation. Two points from the Brown decision(s) are important 
when considering action taken by the courts. First, in Brown I the 
Supreme Court ruled that state laws requiring separate schools for 
the races are illegal. In regard to this, the Court said that 
"separate but equal facilities cannot be equal." In Brown II, a 
second key point was made when the Court required that desegregation 
plans were to proceed "with all deliberate speed." 
This chapter presents a review of landmark decisions and other 
significant court decisions regarding busing for school desegregation. 
Each case is presented by giving the facts of the case, the decision 
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in the case, and a discussion of the case. Categories and cases are 
listed below: 
1. Legalized Busing: 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971). 
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County 
(1971). 
2. Alteration of School Districts: 
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia (1972). 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education 
(1971). 
3. Intent to Segregate: 
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado (1973). 
Mi 11iken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley (1974). 
Buchanan v. Evans (1975). 
4. Annual Readjustment of Attendance Zones: 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler (1976). 
5. Extent of the Remedy: 
Austin Independent School District v. United States (1976). 
Dayton Borad of Education v. Brinkman (1979). 
Columbus Board of Education v. Pennick (1979). 
6. Once a School System is Unitary: 
Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk (1986). 
Powell v. Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Public 
Schools (1986). 
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These landmark United States Supreme Court decisions are 
reviewed because they pertain directly to this study. Decisions in 
landmark cases have established legal precedents which influence the 
decisions of lower courts related to busing for school desegregation. 
Decisions from lower courts presented in this chapter are important 
in that they establish precedent until the Supreme Court addresses 
the question of when a school system may end busing for school 
desegregation. 
4.1 Legalized Busing 
Overview. Following the Brown decisions of 1954 and 1955 
desegregation of de jure segregated school systems in the South moved 
at a snail's pace. Growing more and more concerned by the reluctance 
of Southern school systems to desegregate, the United States Supreme 
Court took stronger and stronger action to insure compliance with its 
decision in Brown. The question of how far the Court would go in 
requiring compliance was answered in the two cases presented in this 
category. Both Swann and Davis were cases where the Supreme Court 
upheld lower court rulings requiring the use of busing to desegregate 
school systems. Both decisions were handed down by the Court on the 
same day. While Swann is considered the landmark legalized busing 
case, Davis is equally important, and actually addressed busing to a 
greater degree than did Swann. 
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
Facts 
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system, with a student body 
which was seventy-one percent white and twenty-nine percent black 
remained largely segregated in 1969. This was true despite implemen­
tation of a 1965 desegregation plan based upon geographic zoning with 
a free-transportation transfer provision. After the school board 
failed to produce a new plan, one was imposed by the district court. 
This plan, known as the Finger Plan, grouped several outlying ele­
mentary schools with each black inner city school and required 
extensive busing. The plan also required that as many schools as 
practicable reflect the seventy-one percent to twenty-nine percent 
white/black ratio then existing in the district as a whole. This 
plan was challenged as being too burdensome. 
Decision 
On a unanimous nine to zero vote, the Supreme Court held that 
when school authorities fail to devise effective remedies for state-
imposed segregation, the district courts have broad discretion to 
fashion a remedy that will assure transition to a unitary school 
system. The Court held the following: 
(1) District courts may constitutionally order that teachers 
be assigned to achieve a certain degree of faculty desegregation. 
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(2) District courts may forbid patterns of school construction 
and abandonment which serve to perpetuate or reestablish a dual 
system. 
(3) Racial quotas, when used not as inflexible requirements 
but as a starting point for the shaping of a desegregation plan, may 
be imposed by the courts. Once desegregation is achieved, school 
boards will not be required to make yearly adjustments in the racial 
composition of student bodies. 
(4) District courts may alter school attendance zones, may 
group and pair noncontiguous zones, and may require busing to a school 
not closest to the students' homes in order to achieve desegregation. 
Discussion 
Swann has become known as the "busing" case. Actually, the 
busing issue in this opinion was somewhat brief. The Court developed 
the thesis in Swann that because bus transportation was an accepted 
tool in education, buses could be effectively used to dismantle a 
dual system. The Court held that a school desegregation plan was to 
be judged by how effective it was. Such a plan might require student 
transportation. Furthermore, when school authorities default in 
their obligation to provide an acceptable remedy to be used to 
desegregate their school system, the district courts had broad power 
to fashion a remedy that would assure a unitary school system. 
134 
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County 
402 U.S. 33 (1971) 
Facts 
The metropolitan area of Mobile, Alabama, was divided by a 
major north-south highway. About ninety-four percent of the black 
students in the metropolitan area lived east of the highway. The 
schools west of the highway were relatively easy to desegregate. 
However, the plan formulated by the Department of Justice and approved 
by the Court of Appeals resulted in nine nearly all-black schools in 
the eastern section. These nine schools served approximately sixty-
four percent of all the black elementary school students in the 
metropolitan area. In addition, over half of the black junior and 
senior high school students in metropolitan Mobile were attending 
all or nearly all-black schools. The plan which led to these results 
dealt with the eastern and western sections separately and did not 
provide for movement of students across the highway as a means for 
desegregation. The adequacy of the plan was challenged. 
Decision 
On a unanimous nine to zero vote the Supreme Court held that 
plans to create constitutionally mandated unitary school systems are 
not limited by the neighborhood school concept. The transition from 
a segregated to a unitary school system should include every effort 
to achieve racial desegregation. Bus transportation and split zoning 
must be given adequate consideration by courts in formulating effec­
tive plans and must be used when other measures are ineffective. 
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Discussion 
Davis seemed to demonstrate even more clearly than did Swann 
that busing could be required to achieve racial balance. The Court 
held that, based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, black school children have a present right to public 
education that is free of state-created or state-supported segrega­
tion. The Court showed that it was disturbed by the delay of school 
systems in the transition to unitary schools. Effective action was 
required now, and such effective action included the busing of 
students. 
4.2 Alteration of School Districts 
Overview 
Following the Supreme Court's lead in Swann and Davis, the 
lower courts began to use busing as a tool to achieve desegregation 
in school systems in the South. Such plans were especially distaste­
ful to many Sourthern school systems and efforts were made by these 
systems to circumvent such court orders. The cases discussed in 
this category, Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia and United 
States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, are classic examples of 
these efforts. Such efforts almost worked, due to the division of 
the Supreme Court Justices on this issue. But when the decisions 
were handed down by the Court, it became evident that the effort to 
desegregate the public schools would not be deterred by school board 
or state legislative action designed to continue segregation. 
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Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia 
407 U.S. 451 (1972) 
Facts 
Until the 1969-70 school year, the public schools in Greenville 
County, Virginia, were run on a segregated basis. All of the white 
students in the county attended schools located in the city of 
Emporia. Black students attended schools located largely outside of 
Emporia. There was one school for blacks in Emporia. 
In 1967, Emporia changed its status from a town to a city that 
could, under Virginia state law, maintain a separate school system. 
However, until a court-ordered adoption of a plan by which all chil­
dren enrolled in a particular grade level would attend the same 
school, Emporia chose to remain part of the county school system. 
Following the desegregation order, Emporia withdrew from the 
county system and proposed a plan for an Emporia-only desegregated 
school system. Emporia's proposal would have resulted in the per­
petuation of the division between better equipped white schools in 
Emporia and black county schools. The validity of creating a 
separate city school system was challenged. 
Decision 
On a five to four vote the Supreme Court ruled against the 
city of Emporia. Segregation had been county-wide. The withdrawal 
of Emporia, the site of the better equipped, traditionally white 
schools, from the county school system had the effect of impeding 
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the dismantling of the segregated school system. Such action was, 
therefore, not permitted. 
Discussion 
The Supreme Court saw through the efforts of the city of 
Emporia to reduce the amount of desegregation that occurred in the 
schools within its boundaries. Discord among the Justices was evi­
dent by the five to four vote. The Court felt that the effect of 
the withdrawal of the city of Emporia from the county school system 
would serve to perpetuate a dual school pattern. Based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's ruling served to prohibit the 
establishment of a separate school system during the time of transi­
tion from a segregated system to a unitary system. 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education 
407 U.S. 484 (1972) 
Facts 
Th- schools of Halifax County, North Carolina, were completely 
segregated by race until 1965. In that year, the school board 
adopted a "freedom-of-choice" plan that resulted in very little 
actual desegregation. In 1968, the Department of Justice and the 
school board agreed on a plan that would create a unitary system for 
Halifax County in the 1969-70 school year. In 1969, the North 
Carolina General Assembly passed a bill enabling the city of Scotland 
Neck to create, by majority vote, its own separate school system. 
Scotland Neck was part of the Halifax County school system. 
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The newly created Scotland Neck school system would be 
fifty-seven percent white and forty-three percent black. The schools 
in the rest of Halifax County would be about ninety percent black. 
Thus the effect of this plan would be to nullify the 1968 desegrega­
tion plan and to maintain a system in which Scotland Neck schools 
were largely white and the county schools were largely black. The 
validity of this state legislation was challenged in this case. 
Decision 
This case was also decided on a five to four vote of the 
Supreme Court. The Court ruled that the dismantling of a segregated 
school system cannot be impeded by the legislative creation of two 
new districts, one largely white and one largely black. The state 
action dividing Halifax County into two school districts was found 
to interfere with the desegregation which is required by law and 
thus the state action was unconstitutional. 
Discussion 
The case was somewhat unique in that a state legislature 
became involved in the attempt to circumvent the Court ruling to 
desegregate. Apparently, the incorrect logic was that the Supreme 
Court would not overrule state legislation. The Supreme Court had 
ruled in Brown that the Fourteenth Amendment fordibs state action 
creating, supporting, or perpetuating segregated public schools. 
That state action involved in this case was legislative rather than 
by the school board does not change its segregative effect or make 
it valid. 
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4.3 Intent to Segregate 
Overview 
Nearly twenty years after Brown the Supreme Court turned its 
attention to the question of de facto segregation. School systems in 
the South had been guilty of de jure segregation because there were 
specific laws requiring separate schools for the races. De facto 
segregation does not result from governmental action intended to 
separate children on the basis of race. Instead, it develops from 
either governmental action adopted without segregative intent or it 
results from the acts of private citizens, such as their choice of 
where to live. The factor that distinguished de jure segregation 
from de facto segregation is intent. 
The cases discussed in this category, Keyes v. School District 
No. 1, Denver, Colorado and Mi 11iken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley, 
present the Court's reaction to cases outside the South which involve 
de facto segregation. The findings in both cases relate directly to 
the Court's perception of the intent of the governmental officials 
involved. 
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado 
413 U.S. 189 (1973) 
Facts 
This case originated in 1967 when suit was brought as a result 
of a shift in the desegregation plans for the Park Hill area schools 
in Denver, Colorado. The Park Hill area schools had become 
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increasingly black. A portion of the original desegregation plan 
called for busing of students in the Park Hill schools in order to 
implement integration in Denver schools. The plan was never carried 
out because of replacement of two school board members. The new 
members opposed the plan. 
The district court found that Park Hill schools were segregated 
and ordered desegregation of Park Hill area schools. The court 
ordered this desegregation because it found evidence that segrega­
tion of the Park Hill area had been caused by prior school board 
action. However, the district court found no evidence of de jure 
segregation in the remainder of the Denver schools and declined to 
force desegregation outside the Park Hill area. In this case, those 
favoring integration of the Denver schools sought desegregation 
orders for the remaining schools in the district and sought to have 
Hispanic students, as well as black students, counted as minority 
students. 
Decision 
On remand, the Supreme Court directed the district court to 
give the school board the opportunity to prove that the Park Hill 
area was a separate area from the rest of the district and thus 
should be treated in isolation. If this could not be proven, then 
the district court was to decide if school board policy had resulted 
in the segregation of Park Hill. The school district was unable to 
prove that the school district was divided into clearly unrelated 
units. School board action was found to have caused segregation in 
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a substantial portion of the district, therefore the entire district 
was found to be segregated. This required desegregation of the 
entire school system. 
Discussion 
Keyes was a distinct landmark decision involving the issue of 
"intent" to segregate. It serves as the legal reference for almost 
all subsequent judicial decisions relating to de facto segregation. 
Subsequent judicial decisions relative to de facto segregation have 
been based upon the legal tenets of this case. This decision meant 
that Northern and Western school districts, guilty of such practices 
as gerrymandering school zones, setting up feeder systems that pro­
moted segregation, and assigning staff on a racially discriminatory 
basis, would be faced with correcting these violations of constitu­
tional rights. But it also meant that plaintiffs would have to 
present convincing evidence of official action responsible for dual 
school systems on a case-by-case basis. 
Mi Hi ken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley 
418 U.S. 717 (1974) 
Facts 
This case arose after a district court ordered a desegregation 
plan for Detroit's schools which encompassed a number of outlying 
school districts as well as the city of Detroit. Detroit did not 
have a history of segregation ordered or permitted by law. However, 
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there was a long history of public and private discrimination that 
had helped produce residential segregation. 
Detroit school children and their parents claimed that the 
school board's imposition of school attendance zones over existing 
segregated residential patterns had produced an unconstitutional 
dual system in Detroit. They cited the school board's policy in 
school construction and its approval of optional attendance zones in 
fringe areas. The district court found the Detroit Board of Education 
and the State of Michigan guilty of segregative actions. The court 
ordered the joining of fifty-three of Detroit's outlying suburban 
school districts with the city school system. The scope of the order 
was staggering with over 310,000 students to be bused daily. 
The fact that unconstitutional segregation existed in Detroit 
was not questioned in this case. What was in question was the 
constitutionality of the court-ordered desegregation plan extending 
to outlying school districts with no history of segregative action 
on the part of their school boards or local governments. 
Decision 
On a five to four vote the Supreme Court found that absent a 
showing that the outlying school districts had failed to operate 
unitary school systems or had committed acts that fostered segregation 
in other school districts, a court-ordered school desegregation plan 
could not cross school district lines to include them in the plan. 
The desegregation plan using busing was to be implemented in Detroit, 
but not expanded to outlying school systems. The district court 
ruling was reversed. 
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Discussion 
Mi Hi ken v. Bradley became the legal foundation for the rejec­
tion of a multi-district remedy for a single district's segregation 
problem. This famous case provided the Court's viewpoint concerning 
the merger of school districts for the purpose of racial balance in 
school districts when only one of the school districts involved was 
responsible for the segregation problem. The district court's 
argument in this case was that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
state action which denied minority group school children equal pro­
tection of the law by maintaining a segregated school system. The 
district court had held that since the outlying school districts were 
subdivisions of the state, and the state contributed to segregation 
in the city of Detroit, therefore, the outlying districts were 
subject to a multi-district school desegregation plan. The Court 
rejected that argument. In order for a multi-district remedy to be 
ordered by a court, the local governments of outlying districts must 
have committed segregative acts. 
Buchanan v. Evans 
423 U.S. 963 (1975) 
Facts 
Action was brought complaining that black children in 
Wilmington, Delaware, were being compelled to attend segregated 
schools. The three-judge trial court held that the presence of 
de jure black schools which remained identifiably black was a clear 
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indication that segregated schooling had never been eliminated in the 
city and that there still existed a dual school system, despite the 
adoption of racially neutral attendance zones. The court required 
the State Board of Education to come forward with plans to remedy 
existing segregation. Consequently, the state passed an act authoriz 
ing the Board of Education to consolidate school districts according 
to the dictates of sound educational administration. The Wilmington 
school district was excluded in the act from reorganization by the 
State Board. The district court held that this statute was unconsti­
tutional. The court imposed an interdistrict remedy involving the 
reorganization or consolidation of the New Castle County School 
District and the Wilmington School District in order to achieve 
desegregation. 
Decision 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, on a six to three 
vote, the district court's decision calling for the implementation of 
an interdistrict busing plan. It was established that the state of 
Delaware and the city of Wilmington were parties to segregative 
policies because Wilmington had been excluded in a state-wide school 
district consolidation act. The Court ruled that act of omission 
constituted de jure segregation. 
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4.4 Annual Readjustment of Attendance Zones 
Overview 
The United States Supreme Court in its original busing decision 
in Swann recognized that communities do not stay the same. It is 
important to remember that students do not have a constitutional 
right to attend integrated schools; they do have the right to attend 
schools that are free of laws and actions that require students of 
different races to attend separate schools. Thus school authorities 
do not have to operate integrated schools unless they have inten­
tionally been operating a dual school system. But what happens once 
a school system that has been declared to be a dual system takes the 
necessary action, including busing, to desegregate its schools? Is 
it necessary for the school system to constantly readjust its 
attendance zones to match the changing demographics of the community 
it serves? This question was addressed by the Supreme Court in the 
landmark case Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler. 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spang!er 
427 U.S. 424 (1976) 
Facts 
As a result of a law suit brought by parents, students, and the 
United States Government, the City of Pasadena, California was ordered 
to desegregate its public schools. The court required that, beginning 
with the 1970-71 school year, there would be no school with a majority 
of any minority students. The board of education assigned students 
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in a racially neutral manner and in 1970-71 the court's requirements 
were met. In the years following 1970-71, the school system had an 
increasing number of schools that were not in compliance with the 
requirement. This change in student population was not caused by 
segregative board action but by random population shifts in the 
district. 
The board of education sought to have the "no majority of 
minority students" requirement dropped. The district court refused 
to grant the school board relief from its order because it perceived 
that the school board had not properly complied with its order after 
the first year it was in force. The school board had adjusted 
attendance zones in 1970 to comply with the order but had not 
readjusted each year thereafter. As a result, schools slipped out of 
literal compliance with the not-to-exceed fifty percent mandate. The 
district court made it clear that it expected the school board to 
readjust student attendance figures yearly to comply with the court's 
ruling. The court of appeals upheld the district court's decision. 
Decision 
On a six to two decision, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that once 
desegregation of student populations was achieved to eliminate school 
system discrimination brought about by official action, school 
officials could not be required to make yearly alterations of student 
assignment plans in order to maintain a strict numerical ratio of 
147 
majority to minority students. Such ratios may be used only as 
guidelines or starting points for the initial transition from segre­
gated to unitary schools. 
Discussion 
The Pasadena case spoke only to students reassignments and 
made it clear that school systems did not have to make annual 
readjustments to attendance zones once they had successfully desegre­
gated. Pasadena did not address the issue of busing itself and at 
what point busing might end. It did show the Court's trend of 
restraint in desegregation cases. Litigation-weary school officials 
were offered some hope by this decision that they would not have to 
go back to court each year. Pasadena hinted at long awaited libera­
tion from judicial supervision and promised an end to annual judicial 
reshufflings. 
4.5 Extent of the Remedy 
Overview 
The degree of the intent to segregate determines the extent of 
the remedy imposed by the courts. The simple fact that segregation 
exists in a sommunity does not mean that the court will impose any 
type of desegregation plan on that community's school system. There 
must also be proof that governmental officials intended segregation 
by not acting and that the school system was segregated as a result 
of this nonaction by officials. The United States Supreme Court used 
this reasoning in three decisions in the late 1970s that clearly 
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showed that the Court would impose a desegregation plan in direct 
proportion to the degree of proven intention to segregate. These 
three cases were Austin Independent School District v. United States, 
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, and Columbus Board of Education 
v. Pennick. 
Austin Independent School District v. United States 
429 U.S. 991 (1976) 
Facts 
The Austin case dealt with a district court order that directed 
the city of Austin, Texas, to implement a busing program for 18,000 
to 25,000 students in order to achieve racial balance in the Austin 
School System. This plan was endorsed by the court of appeals. The 
plan included busing of kindergarten through eighth-gradie students 
in schools over fifty percent minority or ninety percent Anglo. The 
extensive busing plan was predicated on findings of the district 
court that Mexican-American children in Austin schools received an 
education that was inferior to the shite students, and thus there 
was a violation of the equal protection clause. Moreover, the court 
found that action of school authorities caused or contributed to 
school segregation and/or continued the segregation practices that 
existed. 
Decision 
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court rejected the plan 
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on its belief that the remedy in desegregation cases must be limited 
to those conditions that are caused by unconstitutional acts of local 
officials, and, in this case, the Court did not find such violations. 
Discussion 
The Austin decision in 1976 indicated a shift in the opinion 
of the Supreme Court. The remedy had to be equivalent to the wrong. 
Desegregation plans were not to be punitive in nature. This was a 
definite change in the Court's philosophy since earlier Court 
decisions had indeed been punitive in nature. In Austin the Court 
held that the extreme remedy of extensive busing exceeded that 
necessary to correct the condition. 
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman 
443 U.S. 526 (1979) 
Facts 
After the Supreme Court had vacated the lower court's order of 
a systemwide remedy in Dayton I, the district court held a supple­
mentary evidentiary hearing. After reviewing the entire record, the 
district court found that although there had been various instances 
of purposeful segregation in the past, there was not proof that 
those acts caused the current segregation that existed in Dayton, 
Ohio, and dismissed the case. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court's dismissal. The Court of Appeals held 
that the consequences of Dayton's dual system in combination with the 
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intentionally segregative impact of its various past practices were 
an appropriate basis for a systemwide plan. 
Decision 
On a five to four vote the United States Supreme Court upheld 
the court of appeals decision to require district-wide busing in 
Dayton. 
Discussion 
An important factor to emerge from this decision was that the 
Court reversed the burden of proof requirement. The Court was now 
stating that school authorities bore responsibility by considering 
the system's segregation status at the time of Brown I as relevant 
to the present case. To establish a sufficient case for a system-
wide remedy, plaintiffs needed only to show that a school board had 
failed to fulfill its duty to disestablish the dual system. It was 
not necessary for plaintiffs to prove each act of the board to be 
discriminatory.1 
The theory of "intent" v. "extent" was also addressed in this 
case. The "extent" of the remedy required, in this case district-
wide busing, was based on the "intent" of officials to segregate the 
school system. 
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Columbus Board of Education v. Pennick 
443 U.S. 449 (1979) 
Facts 
A group of students in the Columbus, Ohio, school system 
brought a class action suit claiming that cumulative actions of the 
board of education had the purpose and effect of causing and per­
petuating racial segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. The district court found the following: (1) at the time of 
Brown the board had not been operating a racially neutral unitary 
school system, but had been operating separate black schools in one 
area of the city as a direct result of intentional acts of the school 
board and its administrators; (2) the school board had failed to 
discharge its constitutional obligation to disestablish the dual 
school system since 1954; and (3) that since 1954 the school board's 
actions and practices had aggravated rather than alleviated racially 
identifiable achools through decisions such as teacher assignment, 
attendance zoning, and school site selection. The district court 
found that these intentionally segregative acts violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment and ordered a systemwide desegregation plan 
using busing. 
Decision 
On a five to two vote the United States Supreme Court upheld 
the district court's ruling. The Court felt that local board actions 
such as teacher assignment, attendance zoning, and school site 
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selection can constitute sufficient proof of discriminatory intent 
and impact to establish an equal protection violation and warrant 
a systematic remedy. 
Discussion 
The Columbus case once again showed the Court's belief that 
the intent to segregate determined the extent of the remedy. The 
Court found clear evidence that the Columbus school system had never 
truly tried to end its dual school system. Such a finding justified 
the extreme measures taken in the desegregation plan ordered by the 
district court. 
4.6 Once a School System is Unitary 
Overview 
Feeling that it has established clear guidelines for decisions 
on the use of busing for desegregation, the Supreme Court has left 
decisions on busing cases to the lower courts since 1979. However, 
circumstances continue to change and once again a new issue must be 
considered. Urban school systems that have implemented desegregation 
plans successfully, and thus have been declared unitary by the courts, 
are facing new problems. These school systems are facing problems 
of white flight, decline of parental participation in schools, and a 
resegregation of schools due to natural demographic changes. 
In an effort to battle these changing conditions, urban school 
systems are looking seriously at a return to neighborhood schools at 
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the elementary school level. This question has not been addressed 
yet by the United States Supreme Court but cases from the Fourth 
and Tenth Circuits have presented divided opinions on the legality 
of returning to neighborhood schools. This section discusses the 
cases of Riddick v. School Board of the City of Norfolk and Powell v. 
Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Public Schools. 
Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk 
784 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986) 
Facts 
The plaintiffs, Paul R. Riddick and others, appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on the 
district court's refusal to invalidate a new pupil assignment plan 
for the elementary schools (grades K-6) in the city of Norfolk, 
Virginia. Under the new assignment plan, mandatory cross-town busing, 
required at first by court order in 1971, was abolished. In its 
place, students were assigned in most instances to neighborhood 
schools, with a transfer provision with free transportation for 
minority students who desired it. This neighborhood school plan was 
adopted by the school board to help alleviate white flight from the 
school system and to help encourage parent participation in the 
schools. Plaintiffs contended that adoption of the new assignment 
plan was racially motivated and that its implementation violated 
their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Decision 
The United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
district court's ruling allowing the return to neighborhood elementary 
schools in Norfolk. The three judge panel was unanimous in its 
decision. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 
Discussion 
Riddick is currently the law in the Fourth Circuit. It allows 
school systems that have been declared unitary to consider a possible 
return to neighborhood schools. The ruling does not give school 
systems the right to end busing at will. It does allow school 
officials to take that step when their school systems meet two 
criteria: (1) when they have "eradicated all vestiges" of segrega­
tion by law, achieving instead thoroughly integrated school systems; 
and (2) there is no proof that the motive is to discriminate against 
blacks. 
Powell v. Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Public Schools 
795 F. 2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1986) 
Facts 
Federal court supervision of the Oklahoma City school system 
began in 1961. A systemwide desegregation plan which included busing 
was ordered by the district court in 1972. In 1977 the school system 
was declared to be unitary and active court supervision was ended. 
Due to a drop in enrollment of white students, a large decrease in 
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parent involvement in the schools, and changing housing patterns the 
school board decided to abandon the court-ordered desegregation plan 
and adopt a new one that reinstituted neighborhood elementary schools 
for grades one through four. The plan had a transfer provision with 
free transportation for minority students if they desired to use it. 
Black parents and students asked the district court to reopen the 
case it had closed in 1977. The district court found the new plan to 
be constitutional and refused to reopen the original case. The 
plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Decision 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court's decision. They ruled that being declared unitary did not end 
the school board's duty to adhere to the court-ordered desegregation 
plan. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 
Discussion 
Dowel 1 is the law in the Tenth Circuit. The court made it 
clear that it would not accept movement by a school board to a plan 
that resegregated the schools. This decision put the burden on the 
school board to prove that the original need for a desegregation plan 
had vanished and that new circumstances made the court-ordered plan 
oppressive. This opinion was in direct conflict with the Fourth 
Circuit's ruling in Riddick. It left open the door for the Oklahoma 
City school board to go back to district court and prove that new 
circumstances dictated the need for a new plan. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.0. Summary. 
5.1. Conclusions. 
5.2. Recommendations. 
5.3. Concluding Statement. 
5.0 Summary 
The process of desegregating the American public schools had 
been extremely slow. The position of the United States Supreme Court 
on this issue has changed and adapted in much the same way as 
America has changed and adapted. Such change has forced the Court 
to address the question of desegregation from several differing 
aspects. 
Prior to the Brown decision(s) of 1954 and 1955 there had been 
three distinct periods in the history of desegregation efforts. Those 
periods included the doctrine of Plessy, the university school case, 
and the Brown case. Different approaches were used by the Court 
during each of these periods to eliminate the injustices that existed. 
The idea of "separate but equal" was the approach used during 
the Plessy period which ran from 1896 to the 1930s. The belief was 
that if public facilities were equal the races could legally be 
separated. This belief applied to all aspects of public life such as 
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public schools, transportation, and even to drinking fountains. The 
"separate but equal" doctrine was considered to be legal and early 
school cases were decided on the basis of this belief. The result 
was that segregation of the races in public schools was considered 
to be legal. Many states actually adopted legislation requiring 
separate schools for blacks and whites. 
Changes began to occur in the attitude of the courts in the 
late 1920s. It was then that the NAACP began to challenge segrega­
tion in the graduate schools of several colleges and universities. 
These attacks were successful in several instances and black students 
gained admission to these all-white schools. 
With the 1954 Brown decision, black students were admitted to 
all-white schools in four separate cases. The Supreme Court 
declared that the "separate but equal11 doctrine could not longer be 
justified. The Court also declared that, because of generations of 
feelings of inferiority by blacks, separate school facilities were 
inherently unequal. Regardless of the condition of separate 
facilities, ruled the Court, they could not be equal as long as they 
were separate. The Brown I decision was based on the Equal Protec­
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Brown II case, decided 
one year later, ordered that the desegregation of dual school systems 
be done with "all deliberate speed." 
Following the Brown decision(s) was a period of time in which 
many school systems originated what the Supreme Court considered to 
158 
be delay tactics and attempts to circumvent desegregation. Such 
efforts to delay or circumvent ranged from freedom of choice plans, to 
gerrymandering school attendance zones, to the actual closing of 
entire school systems. The Court issued decisions requiring that 
such systems be desegregated immediately. These decisions placed the 
responsibility for seeing that desegregation was achieved directly 
on local school boards. Often, desegregation plans were designed by 
the lower courts and imposed on school districts. Components of 
these public school desegregation plans included students, transpor­
tation, buildings, and faculty and staff. 
Five questions were formulated and listed in Chapter I of this 
study. While the review of literature provided an understanding of 
the historical background of segregation, the answers to these ques­
tions were contained in Chapters III and IV. The answers to these 
questions offer school administrators and other educational decision­
makers a legal basis on which to make decisions concerning the use 
of busing for the desegregation of public schools. 
The first question listed in Chapter I was: 
How has the Supreme Court ruled on the legality of busing 
involving de jure segregated school systems from Brown 
(1954) to 1988? 
It was the finding of this study that the United States 
Supreme Court has consistently ruled against any school system in 
which de jure segregation has been found to exist. The Supreme Court 
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has said that it is not possible to have equal educational opportunity 
if de jure segregation is present in a school system. De jure segre­
gation is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment. School systems that have been found by the Court 
to have engaged in de jure segregation have been required to take 
affirmative steps to eliminate dual school systems. School boards all 
across the United States have been ordered to eliminate all vestiges 
of de jure segregation. The remedy imposed on school boards has 
usually included extensive busing of students outside their neighbor­
hoods to achieve better racial balance in the schools. 
The second question listed in Chapter I was: 
How has the Supreme Court ruled on the legality of busing 
involving de facto segregated school systems from Brown 
(1954) to 1988? 
It was the finding of this study that in de facto segregation 
cases prior to 1976, the Supreme Court required some busing as a 
punitive remedy. From 1976 to the present, the Supreme Court has 
developed a conservative posture in de facto segregation cases. The 
key to Supreme Court decisions concerning de facto segregation has 
involved a case by case investigation of the intent of governmental 
actions that have caused segregation to occur. If there is no evi­
dence of intentional action to segregate, the Court has found no 
constitutional violation and has ruled in favor of the school system. 
When an intent to segregate was found by the Court, the remedy imposed 
often included extensive busing for highly segregated school systems. 
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The Court has gone as far as requiring the consolidation of school 
systems with cross-district busing as part of the remedy. In de facto 
segregation cases the Court has considered the intent to segregate in 
deciding the extent of the remedy required. 
The third question listed in Chapter I was: 
How has the Supreme Court ruled in cases where the intent 
to segregate by school officials was proven? 
It was the finding of this study that the United States Supreme 
Court's philosophy included a consideration of the intent to segre­
gate by governmental agencies. When the intent to segregate was 
found, the extent of the remedy often included extensive busing as a 
remedy for highly segregated school systems. This philosophy of the 
Court is known as the "intent" v. "extent" theory. The extent of the 
remedy imposed is determined by the intent of the segregative action. 
The fourth question listed in Chapter I was: 
How has the Supreme Court ruled on the legality of busing in 
school systems that have achieved unitary status but have 
since undergone resegregation? 
It was the finding of this study that the Supreme Court has 
ruled that a court may order desegregation only if a school board 
has engaged in de jure segregation. Consequently, the goal of court-
ordered desegregation required by the Supreme Court is the ending of 
intentional segregation by school boards. The goal of achieving an 
enduring racial balance in a school system is not the concern of the 
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Supreme Court. The Court has held that year-by-year adjustments of 
the racial composition of student enrollment are not required of 
local school systems once they have implemented a court-ordered 
desegregation plan. Once a school system has been declared by the 
courts to be unitary, the system's only responsibility is to avoid 
illegal segregation. This means that a school system cannot take 
action that is intended to separate the races. It does not mean that 
a local school board may not implement a plan for valid educational 
reasons that might possibly result in a resegregation of the schools. 
The Supreme Court, in its refusal to hear two recent cases, has 
left unanswered the question of when a unitary school system will be 
allowed to end a court-ordered busing plan. However, its refusal to 
overturn a plan which ends the busing of elementary school students 
in Norfolk, Virginia, strongly indicates that the Court will allow 
busing to end under certain circumstances. 
The fifth question listed in Chapter I was: 
Are there specific trends to be determined from analysis 
of court cases? 
It was the finding of this study that there is a trend for the 
Supreme Court to allow, under proper circumstances, a return to ' 
neighborhood schools at the elementary school level. This will only 
be allowed where a school system has been found to be unitary and 
where there is clear evidence that there is no intent by the school 
board to separate students by race. There must be valid reasons for 
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the school board's desire to end busing and return to neighborhood 
schools. Such valid reasons include white flight, decrease in 
parental involvement in the schools, and the natural demographic 
changes of communities. The Supreme Court has said, in effect, that 
equal educational opportunity is not possible under de jure segrega­
tion but is possible under de facto segregation. 
5.1 Conclusions 
The following conclusions are presented, based on an analysis 
of United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with desegregation 
and, more specifically, busing. The information serves as a founda­
tion for understanding how future cases may be decided by lower 
courts as well as by the United States Supreme Court. 
(1) Racial imbalance among public school students violates 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it results 
from policies, decisions, and acts of public officials carried out 
with intent to produce segregation (de jure segregation), but not if 
it results solely from demographic patterns (de facto segregation). 
(2) The Court has held that if a dual system existed in a 
school system in 1954, then the school board has a continuing duty to 
eradicate the effects of the dual system. 
(3) It is within the power of the courts to order relief by 
using bus transportation as a tool to desegregate a school system. 
(4) There is no Constitutional requirement that a desegrega­
tion plan must always reflect the racial composition of the community 
in the school system. 
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(5) School authorities are not required to make year-to-year 
adjustments once a plan that will achieve a unitary system has been 
implemented. 
(6) Creation of new school systems will not be tolerated by 
the Court if such creation will have a detrimental effect on a school 
system in the process of dismantling its dual system. 
(7) In de facto desegregation cases the burden of proof is on 
the plaintiff to show that there was segregative intent in either 
making policy or failing to act by local governmental officials. 
(8) An interdistrict remedy by the courts for proven de jure 
segregation is possible only if it has been shown that there were 
constitutional violations within all of the affected school districts. 
(9) A school system found in violation by the courts can 
expect the imposed remedy to be based upon the intent of the 
constitutional violation, and the extent of the remedy would not 
exceed that which is necessary to eliminate the segregative effect of 
the violation. 
(10) Once a school system has eradicated all vestiges of 
segregation, has been declared unitary by the courts, can show clear 
educational reasons as its motive, and there is no proof of an intent 
to discriminate against blacks, a return to neighborhood schools may 
be permitted. 
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5.2 Recommendations 
The stated purpose of this study was to present a historical 
perspective and legal basis for Supreme Court-ordered busing to 
desegregate the public schools. The study was planned to help pro­
vide direction to educational decision-makers as they make decisions 
concerning student assignment policies. The information presented 
does provide direction to school districts now under court-ordered 
busing plans that may be considering a return to neighborhood schools. 
School officials can fairly well ascertain the opinion of the 
Supreme Court in the question of busing. No major decisions have 
been made by the Court since the 1979 Dayton case. It is unlikely 
that the Supreme Court will again become involved in de jure or 
de facto segregation cases. The Court feels that it has established 
the appropriate legal precedents for such cases and prefers to leave 
these cases to the lower courts. There are strong indications that 
the Supreme Court will, at an appropriate time in the near future, 
hand down a landmark decision concerning the possible return to 
neighborhood schools by school systems that have been declared 
unitary. 
De jure segregation in American public schools has all but 
been eradicated. With the exception of those school systems still 
under court order to bus students as part of a desegregation plan, 
this should not be an issue in the future. Such boards should be 
careful not to adopt any policy or plan that intentionally segre­
gates the races. 
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De facto segregation still provides opportunity for legal 
action. De facto segregation is permissible before the law and does 
not require any specific action on behalf of the governing bodies to 
change or correct this situation if state or local officials were not 
responsible for the segregation. Boards of education must be care­
ful in establishing attendance zones, constructing new schools, and 
making other decisions that might result in segregated schools. Such 
actions could result in a belief by the courts of segregative intent 
which could lead to some type of desegregation plan being required. 
This plan could involve busing. 
In a school system that is making the transition from a dual 
system to a unitary system, there should be the expectation that the 
system will be closely scrutinized. If the system has schools that 
are all or predominantly of one race, and the system is composed of 
students from mixed populations, assignments to those schools will 
be studied to determine if segregative intent exists in the school 
system. Attendance policies that result in racially identifiable or 
unbalanced schools are a signal to the federal court that is super­
vising the transition, and school authorities must be prepared to 
justify the attendance policies on sound educational grounds. 
A large number of school systems have implemented desegrega­
tion plans for several years and have now been declared unitary by 
the courts. Once a school district has completed its duty to desegre­
gate its schools and has been declared unitary, it has no further 
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constitutional duty to maintain integration. Its only duty is to 
avoid illegal segregation. Neither school authorities nor district 
courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments 
of the racial composition of student bodies to keep the schools 
racially balanced. If the supervising federal court has declared 
the school system to be unitary, the school board is then free to 
pursue any legitimate policies it may desire. The school board may 
determine that there exists areas of concern that are more important 
than the continuation of busing. 
Many school districts, primarily those in urban areas, are 
finding that court-ordered desegregation plans designed to improve 
racial balance are actually making things worse by triggering white 
flight. This white flight leads to a reduced involvement of parents 
in the schools and ultimately to a school system that is heavily 
populated by blacks and other minorities. There have been attempts 
by two such systems in Norfolk, Virginia and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
to end cross-town busing for elementary students as an effort to 
discourage and reverse white flight. While the Supreme Court has 
refused to hear appeals on these two cases, it is extremely important 
to note that the Court refused to stop the implementation of such a 
plan in Norfolk. The result of this refusal by the Court is that the 
Norfolk City Schools, which have been declared unitary by the courts, 
are being allowed to end busing for elementary school students and 
return to neighborhood schools at the elementary level. The Court's 
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refusal to stop the implementation of Norfolk's plan is a strong 
indication that the Court is willing to allow an end to busing by 
systems that have been declared unitary and have legitimate reasons 
to return to neighborhood schools. 
It is unlikely that the Court will allow busing to end at the 
middle school or high school level. Certainly, school systems 
located in the Fourth Circuit can give strong consideration to a 
return to neighborhood schools at the elementary level if they meet 
the criteria discussed in this section. Such potential action must 
be based on sound educational reasons and the local school board 
should work through the original supervising court before implement­
ing such a plan. School systems located in the Tenth Circuit can 
approach the court about plans for the possible return to neighborhood 
schools. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals is unlikely to approve 
any such plan if the result of the plan is resegregation of the 
schools. 
It is important to note that even if a court has no basis for 
ordering busing, a school board is free to establish and maintain a 
busing program. If local school authorities decide that each school 
should have a prescribed racial balance which reflects the balance 
of the district as a whole, the board has the power to implement such 
a plan. 
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5.3 Concluding Statement 
Boards of education face many very difficult and emotional 
decisions as they seek to offer the very best education possible for 
each student. As boards make decisions they must be ever mindful of 
the legality of the actions they take. In designing school attendance 
policies and in changing a busing program, boards of education are 
limited by the Constitution. Local or state officials may not engage 
in deliberate segregation on the basis of race. If such segregation 
occurred in the past, present school officials must take the action 
necessary to eradicate the effects of that segregation. A school 
board also cannot adopt a policy that, even though not intended to 
cause segregation of the races, is intended to have an adverse impact 
on minority children and has that effect. 
If these constitutional restrictions are properly observed, 
the formulation of a student assignment policy becomes a task that 
involves the local board in deciding among competing values. What is 
more important, racial balance or an end to white flight? What is 
more important, having students attend neighborhood schools or having 
students experience educational opportunities with students of other 
races? This study has shown that Supreme Court decisions have 
adapted arid evolved to the point where a school board may choose to 
give other legitimate concerns greater priority than it gives to 
racial balance and it may, under specific circumstances, return to 
neighborhood schools at the elementary school level. 
169 
TABLE OF CASES 
A 
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969). 
Austin Independent School District v. United States, 429 U.S. 991 
(1976). 
B 
Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 795 
F. 2d 1516 (1536). 
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F. 2d 215 (CA6 1973). 
Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, 412 F. 2d 
1058 (1972). 
Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. South Carolina 1952). 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 345 U.S. 973 (1953). 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
Bustop v. The Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles, 439 
U.S. 1380 (1978). 
170 
C 
Carter v. West Faliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970). 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
Columbus Board of Education v. Pennick, 443 U.S. 461 (1979). 
Cooper, Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock, 
Arkansas, Independent School District v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 
(1958). 
Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528, Ga. 
(1899). 
D 
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 
(1971). 
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp. 
337 (1952). 
Dayton Board of Education v. Brickman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
Dayton Board of Education v. Brickman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
Dowel1 v. Board of Education of the Oklahoma City Schools, 606 F. 
Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985). 
Dowel 1 v. Board of Education of the Okalhoma City Schools, 795 F. 
2d 1516 (10th Circuit 1986). 
Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228 (1972). 
171 
E 
Evans v. Buchanan, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). 
G 
Gaines v. Canada, Registrar of the University of Missouri, 305 U.S. 
337 (1938). 
Gebhart v. Belton, 91A 2d 137 (1952). 
Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, Tennessee, 373 U.S. 683 
(1963). 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia, 391 U.S. 
430 (1968). 
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 337 U.S. 
218 (1964). 
H 
flobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967). 
K 
Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 
(1973). 
M 
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971). 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
172 
Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450 (1968). 
N 
Newburg Area Council v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 421 
U.S. 391 (1974). 
Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis, Tennessee, City 
Schools, 397 U.S. 232 (1970). 
P 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 558 (1896). 
R 
Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School District, 391 U.S. 
443 (1968). 
Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk, 784 F. 2d 521 (4th Circuit 1986). 
Roberts v. The City of Boston, 59 Massachusetts (5 Cushing) 198 
(1849). 
Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965). 
173 
S 
School Board of Richmond, Virginia v. State Board of Education of 
Virginia, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). 
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F. 2d 
1211 (5th Circ. 1969). 
Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
T 
Tasby v. Estes, 517 2d 103 (1975). 
U 
United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 
(1969). 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 
(1971). 
U 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education v. Catherine Scott, 
404 U.S. 1221 (1971). 
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). 
174 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Bardolph, Richard. The Civil Rights Record. New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell, 1970. 
Barth, Alan. Prophets With Honor. New York: Random House, 1974. 
Bergman, Peter M. The Chronological History of the Negro in America. 
New York: New American Library, 1969. 
Bolner, James. Busing: The Political and Judicial Process. New 
York: Praeger, 1974. 
Dollard, John. Caste and Class in a Southern Town. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1937. 
Friedman, Leon (ed.). Argument: The Complete Oral Argument Before 
the Supreme Court~in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 
New York: Chelsea House, 1969. 
Fuller, James N. The Legal Aspects of Busing for Desegregation in 
De Facto Segregated School Districts. Ed.D. Dissertation, 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1983. 
Garraty, John A. Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1964. 
Graglia, Lino A. Disaster by Decree. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1976. 
Hudgins, H. C., Jr. The Warren Court and the Public Schools. 
Danville, Illinois: Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1970. 
Johnson, Charles S. Statistical Atlas of Sourthern Counties. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina, 1941. 
Liston, Robert A. Tides of Justice. New York: Delacorte Press, 
1966. 
Meier, August and Elliott Rudwick. The Making of Black America. 
Vol. II. New York: Atheneum, 1969. 
175 
Mills, Nicolaus. The Great School Bus Controversy. New York: 
Teachers College Press, 1972. 
Myrdal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma. New York: Harper and Row, 
1962. 
Nolte, Chester M. School Law in Action, 101 Key Decisions With Guide-
lines for School Administrators. West Nyack, N.Y.: Parker, 
wn 
Ploski, Harry A. and Ernest Kaiser. The Negro Almanac. New York 
Bellwether, 1971. 
Read, Frank T. "Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration 
Since Brown v. Board of Education." In The Courts, Social 
Science, and School Desegregation. Edited by Betsy Levin and 
W. C. Hawley. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1975. 
Reutter, E. Edmund, Jr. and Robert R. Hamilton. The Law of Public 
Education. 3rd Edition. Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 
1985: 
Reutter, E. Edmund, Jr. The Supreme Court's Impact on Public Educa­
tion. Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 1982. 
Stedman, James B. Busing for Segregation. Issue Brief Number IB 
81010. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, 1982. 
Stockard, Robert M. The United States Supreme Court and the Legal 
Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation. Ed. D. 
Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1978. 
The Lincoln Library. 31st Edition. Buffalo, N.Y.: Frontier Press, 
tot: 
U.S. Commission on Civil Right. Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of 
the Law: Desegregation of the Nation's Public Schools. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Twenty Years After Brown: Equality 
of Educational Opportunity. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, i975. 
U.S. Congress, Senate. A Question of Intent. Washington, D.C.: 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, 1959. 
176 
Wilkinson, J. Harvie, III. From Brown to Bakke. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979. 
Woodward, C. Vann. The Strange Career of Jim Crow. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1968. 
Zirkel, Perry A. A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education. Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 1978. 
Zirkel, Perry A. Supplement to a Digest of Supreme Court Decisions 
Affecting Education. Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 
T9S2--
Journals, Periodicals and Newspapers 
"Another Year of Turmoil in Schools?" U.S. News and World Report, 
September 31, 1976, p. 31. 
"Conflicting Desegregation Rulings Upheld." Legal Notes for Educa­
tion , December 1986, p. 8. 
Education USA, June 9, 1986, p. 316. 
Education Week, February 19, 1986, p. 18. 
Education Week, February 26, 1986, p. 9. 
Education Week, December 17, 1986, p. 6. 
Greensboro News and Record, February 8, 1986, p. C8. 
Greensboro News and Record, November 14, 198b, p. A18. 
"High Court Bans School Segregation: 9-to-0 Decision Grants Time to 
Comply." The New York Times, May 18, 1954, p. 14. 
Legal Notes for Education. Volume VII, Number 11 (March 1986). 
Rosemount, Minnesota: Data Research, Inc. 
Legal Notes for Education. Volume VII, Number 20 (December 1986). 
Rosemount, Minnesota: Data Research, Inc. 
Los Angeles Times, April 22, 1971. 
Mesibov, Laurie. "Busing in Unitary School Districts: A Board's 
Right to Modify the Plan," School Law Bulletin, Fall 1986, 
pp. 19-27. 
177 
Mirga, Tom. "Justices Decline to Review Cases on Desegregation," 
Education Week, November 12, 1986, p. 1. 
Mills, Nicholaus. "Busing: Who's Being Taken for a Ride?" 
Commonweal, March 24, 1972, p. 4. 
New York Times, June 17, 1986, p. 11. 
News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 17, 1986, p. 1A. 
News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), April lb, 1986, p. 2A. 
Pennsylvania Gazette. No. 2481, July 10, 1776. 
Press, Aric and Ann McDaniel. "Busing: The Next Phase," Newsweek, 
November 17, 1986, pp. 60-61. 
School Law Bulletin, Summer 1986, pp. 35-36. 
School Law News, November 20, 1984, p. 7. 
School Law News, February 20, 1986, p. 1. 
Sendor, Benjamin. "These Two Cases Raise Key Questions (But Offer 
Ambiguous Answers) About School Desegregation," American 
School Board Journal, January 1987, pp. 12-13. 
"Testing Time for Busing," Newsweek, September 8, 1975, p. 79. 
Legal Documents 
Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866. 14 Stat. 27. 
Emancipation Proclamation. 12 Stat. 1268 (1863). 
Third Enforcement Act of April 20, 1871. 17 Stat. 13. 
United States, Constitution. Amendment V. 
United States, Constitution. Amendment XIII, Section 1. 
United States, Constitution. Amendment XIV, Section 1. 
178 
Legal Publications 
American Jurisprudence. 2nd ed. Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers' 
Cooperative; San Francisco: Bancraft-Whitney, 1962-19. 
Corpus Juris Secundum. Brooklyn, N.Y.: American Law Book Co., 
193b-1950. 
The Federal Reporter. St. Paul, Minnesota: West, 1880. 
The Federal Supplement. St. Paul, Minnesota: West, 1932. 
National Reporter System. St. Paul, Minnesota: West, 1880. 
The Supreme Court Reporter. St. Paul Minnesota: West, 1882. 
U.S. Report, Lawyers' Edition. Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers' Coopera­
tive, 1882. 
